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1 INTRODUCTION
Distributed systems are omnipresent and complex, and they can malfunction for many reasons, including software bugs
and hardware or network failures. Monitoring is an attractive option for verifying at runtime whether a system behavior
is correct with respect to a given specification. But distribution opens new challenges. The monitors themselves become
components of the (extended) system and like any other system component they may exhibit delays, finite or even
infinite, when communicating with other components.
Various runtime-verification approaches exist for different kinds of systems, including distributed systems [Barringer
et al. 2004; Basin et al. 2015b; Bauer and Falcone 2016; Bauer et al. 2011; Falcone et al. 2014; Maler and Nickovic 2004;
Meredith et al. 2012; Mostafa and Bonakdarbour 2015; Sen et al. 2004]. The specification languages used in these
approaches are typically based on temporal logics or finite-state machines, which describe the correct system behavior
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2 Basin et al.
in terms of infinite streams of system actions. However, at any point in time, a monitor has only partial knowledge
about the system’s behavior. In particular, a monitor can at best only be aware of the actions the system performed so
far, which correspond to a finite prefix of the infinite action stream. For this reason, many of the runtime-verification
approaches rely on an extension of the standard Boolean semantics of the linear-time temporal logic LTL with a third
truth value, as proposed by Bauer et al. [2010]. Namely, an LTL formula evaluates to the Boolean truth value b on a
finite stream of actions σ if the formula evaluates to b on all infinite streams that extend σ ; otherwise, the formula’s
truth value is unknown on σ .
This three-valued semantics, however, only accounts for settings where monitors are always aware of all previously
performed actions. It is insufficient to reason soundly and completely about system behavior at runtime when, for
example, unreliable channels are used to inform the monitors about the actions performed. In fact, the existing runtime-
verification approaches are of limited use for distributed systems where components might crash or network failures
occur, for example, when a component is temporarily unreachable and a monitor therefore cannot learn the component’s
behavior during this time period. Even in the absence of failures, monitors can receive messages about the system
behavior in any order due to network delays. A naive solution for coping with out-of-order message delivery is to
have the monitor buffer messages and reorder them prior to processing them. However, this can delay reporting a
violation when the violation is already detectable on some of the buffered messages. This is undesirable for applications
where one cannot afford to wait and the monitor should promptly output its verdict. Moreover, the verdict should
remain correct when some of the monitor’s knowledge gaps are subsequently closed. Another limitation concerns
the expressivity of the specification languages used by the existing runtime-verification approaches for distributed
systems. It is not possible to express real-time constraints, which are common requirements for distributed systems.
Such constraints specify, for example, deadlines to be met. Furthermore, the supported specification languages cannot
handle data values.
In this paper, we present a runtime-verification approach that overcomes these limitations. Our approach handles
specifications that are given as formulas in an extension of the real-time logic MTL [Alur and Henzinger 1992; Koymans
1990]. Namely, we extend MTL with a freeze quantifier [Henzinger 1990] to extract data values from events and bind
these values to logical variables. We call this extension MTL↓ (pronounced “MTL freeze”), where ↓ is the symbol for
the freeze quantifier. Our runtime-verification approach accounts for out-of-order message deliveries and soundly
operates in the presence of failures, such as components crashing. We also provide completeness guarantees for our
approach, roughly meaning that in the absence of failures but with arbitrary finite message delays, violations and
satisfactions of specifications are eventually reported. We build upon a timed model for distributed systems [Cristian
and Fetzer 1999]. The system components use their local clocks to timestamp observations, which they send to the
monitors. The monitors use these timestamps to determine the elapsed time between observations, for example, to
check whether real-time constraints are met. Furthermore, the timestamps totally order the observations. This is in
contrast to a time-free model [Fischer et al. 1985], where the events of a distributed system can only be partially ordered,
for example, using Lamport timestamps [Lamport 1978]. However, since the accuracy of existing clocks is limited, the
monitors’ conclusions might only be valid for the provided timestamps. See Section 7.2, where we elaborate on this
point.
A cornerstone of our monitoring approach is a new three-valued semantics for MTL↓ that is well suited to reason in
settings where system components communicate with the monitors over unreliable channels. Specifically, we define
MTL↓’s semantics over the three truth values t, f, and ⊥. We interpret these truth values as in Kleene logic [Kleene
1950] and conservatively extend the logic’s standard Boolean semantics, where t and f stand for “true” and “false,”
Runtime Verification over Out-of-order Streams 3
respectively, and the third truth value ⊥ stands for “unknown” and accounts for the monitor’s knowledge gaps. The
models of MTL↓ are finite words where knowledge gaps are explicitly represented. Intuitively, a finite word corresponds
to a monitor’s knowledge about the system behavior at a given time and the knowledge gaps may result from message
delays, losses, crashed components, and the like. Critically in our setting, reasoning is monotonic with respect to the
partial order on truth values, where ⊥ is less than t and f, and t and f are incomparable. This monotonicity property
guarantees that closing knowledge gaps does not invalidate previously obtained Boolean truth values.
We also present online algorithms for verifying systems at runtime with respect to MTL↓ specifications. Our
algorithms’ output is sound and complete for MTL↓’s three-valued semantics and with respect to the monitor’s partial
knowledge about the actions performed at each point in time. In a nutshell, the algorithms work as follows. They
receive as input timestamped messages from the system components, which describe the actions these components
perform. No assumptions are made on the order in which these messages are received. The algorithms update their state
for each received message. This state comprises an acyclic graph structure for reasoning about the system behavior,
that is, computing verdicts about the monitored specification’s fulfillment. The graph’s nodes store the truth values of
the subformulas for the different times that data values are frozen to quantified variables, including the times with no
or only partial knowledge. The graph is refined when the monitor receives knowledge about a specific point in time,
whereby the nodes representing the knowledge gap are split and instantiated. In each such update, the algorithms
propagate data values down to the graph’s leaves and propagate Boolean truth values for subformulas up along the
graph’s edges. When a Boolean truth value is propagated to a root node of the graph, the algorithms output a verdict.
Overall, our main contributions are as follows. First, we define a new three-valued semantics for a temporal logic,
which is well suited for runtime verification, in particular, for reasoning about incomplete traces. Second, we present
online algorithms to reason soundly and completely about incomplete traces. Moreover, these algorithms output verdicts
promptly. Third, we experimentally evaluate the performance of our algorithms and explore the performance impact on
handling messages that arrive out of order. Finally, we describe the deployment of our online algorithms for verifying
distributed systems at runtime.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we provide preliminaries. In Section 3, we present
our new three-valued semantics for monitoring. In Sections 4 and 5, we present our monitoring algorithms, including a
proof of their correctness. We evaluate our algorithms in Section 6. In Section 7, we describe the deployment of our
runtime-verification approach for distributed systems. Finally, in Sections 8 and 9, we discuss related work and draw
conclusions.
2 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we recall standard notation and terminology that will be used throughout the paper.
Intervals. An interval I is a nonempty subset of the positive rationals Q≥0 such that if a,b ∈ I and a ≤ c ≤ b then
c ∈ I , for all a,b, c ∈ Q≥0. We use standard notation and terminology for intervals. For example, (a,b] denotes the
interval that is left-open with bound a and right-closed with bound b. Note that an interval I with cardinality |I | = 1 is a
singleton I = {τ } = [τ ,τ ], for some τ ∈ Q≥0. An interval I is unbounded if its right bound is∞, and bounded otherwise.
With less-than, <, we denote the partial order on intervals, that is I < J iff I ∩ J = ∅ and I ’s right bound is not greater
than J ’s left bound. Let I − J := {τ − τ ′ | τ ∈ I and τ ′ ∈ J } ∩ Q≥0.
Partial Functions. For a partial function f : A↛ B, let def(f ) := {a ∈ A | f (a) is defined}. If def(f ) = {a1, . . . ,an },
for some n ∈ N, then we also write [a1 7→ f (a1), . . . ,an 7→ f (an )] for f , when f ’s domain A and its codomain B
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Table 1. Truth tables for three-valued logical operators (strong Kleene logic).
¬
t f
f t
⊥ ⊥
∨ t f ⊥
t t t t
f t f ⊥
⊥ t ⊥ ⊥
∧ t f ⊥
t t f ⊥
f f f f
⊥ ⊥ f ⊥
→ t f ⊥
t t f ⊥
f t t t
⊥ t ⊥ ⊥
are irrelevant or clear from the context. Note that [ ] denotes the partial function that is undefined everywhere. We
also carry over the notation for set comprehension, for instance, [a 7→ a + 1 | a ≥ 0 and a is even] denotes the partial
function that is defined on the nonnegative even integers and returns their successor. Furthermore, we write f [a 7→ b]
to denote the update of a partial function f : A↛ B at a ∈ A, that is, f [a 7→ b] equals f , except that a is mapped to
b if b ∈ B, and a < def(f [a 7→ b]) if b < B. With f [a 7→ ⊥] we denote the restriction of f to the domain def(f ) \ {a}.
Finally, for partial functions f ,д : A↛ B, we write f Ď д if def(f ) ⊆ def(д) and f (a) = д(a), for all a ∈ def(f ).
Truth Values. Let 3 be the set {t, f,⊥}, where t (true) and f (false) denote the standard Boolean values, and ⊥ denotes
the truth value “unknown.” Table 1 shows the truth tables of some standard logical operators over 3. Observe that these
operators coincide with their Boolean counterparts when restricted to the set 2 := {t, f}. We partially order the elements
in 3 by their knowledge: ⊥ ≺ t, ⊥ ≺ f, and t and f are incomparable as they carry the same amount of knowledge. Note
that (3,≺) is a lower semilattice where ⋏ denotes the meet. We remark that the operators in Table 1 are monotonic,
which ensures that reasoning is monotonic in knowledge. Intuitively, when closing a knowledge gap, represented by ⊥,
with t or f, we never obtain a truth value that disagrees with the previous one.
Timed Words. Let Σ be an alphabet. A timed word over Σ is an infinite word (τ0,a0)(τ1,a1) . . . ∈ (Q≥0 × Σ)ω , where
the sequence of τi s is strictly monotonic and nonzeno, that is, τi < τi+1, for every i ∈ N, and for every t ∈ Q≥0, there is
some i ∈ N such that τi > t . Note that we use a dense time domain and assume a nonfictitious clock semantics, that is,
there is no stuttering of equal timestamps.
Metric Temporal Logic. Let P be a finite set of predicate symbols, where ι(p) denotes the arity of p ∈ P . Furthermore,
letV be a set of variables and R a finite set of registers. The syntax of the real-time logic MTL↓ is given by the grammar:
φ ::= t
 p(x1, . . . ,xι(p))  ↓rx . φ  ¬φ  φ ∨ φ   I φ  #I φ  φ SI φ  φ UI φ ,
where p ∈ P , x ,x1,x2 . . . ,xι(p) ∈ V , r ∈ R, and I is an interval. We remark that MTL↓ extends the standard propositional
metric temporal logic (MTL) [Alur and Henzinger 1992; Koymans 1990] with a freeze quantifier ↓. We call a formula an
MTL formula if all the predicate symbols occurring in it have arity 0 and the freeze quantifier does not occur in it.
A formula is closed if each variable occurrence is bound by a freeze quantifier. A formula is temporal if the connective
at the root of the formula’s syntax tree is  I , #I , SI , or UI . We denote by sub(φ) the set of φ’s subformulas. We employ
standard syntactic sugar. For example, φ∧ψ abbreviates ¬(¬φ∨¬ψ ), φ → ψ abbreviates ¬φ∨ψ , and 2I φ (“eventually”)
and 2I φ (“always”) abbreviate t UI φ and ¬ 2I ¬φ, respectively. The past-time counterparts ■I φ (“once”) and ■I φ
(“historically”) are defined as expected. The nonmetric variants of the temporal connectives are also easily defined,
for example, 2φ := 2[0,∞) φ. We also use standard conventions concerning the connectives’ binding strength to omit
parentheses. For example, ¬ binds stronger than ∧, which binds stronger than ∨, and the connectives ¬, ∨, etc. bind
stronger than the temporal connectives, which bind stronger than the freeze quantifier. Finally, to simplify notation, we
omit the superscript r in formulas like ↓rx . φ whenever r ∈ R is irrelevant or clear from the context.
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Example 2.1. Before defining MTL↓’s semantics, we provide some intuition. The following formula formalizes the
policy that whenever a customer executes a transaction that exceeds some threshold (e.g., $2,000), then this customer
must not execute any other transaction for a fixed time period (e.g., 3 days).
2↓cidc . ↓tidt . ↓suma . trans(c, t ,a) ∧ a > 2000 → 2(0,3] ↓tidt ′ . ↓suma′ . ¬trans(c, t ′,a′)
Note that in the formula, we take the liberty to deviate slightly from the given grammar, which does not include
constant and function symbols. Such an extension would be straightforward, but we omit it for the sake of brevity. In
particular, the formula contains the constant symbol 2000, interpreted as expected. Furthermore, the binary predicate
symbol >, also with its expected rigid interpretation, is written in infix.
We assume that the predicate symbol trans is interpreted as a singleton relation or the empty set at any point in time.
For instance, the interpretation {(Alice, 42, 99)} of trans at time τ describes the action of Alice executing a transaction
with identifier 42 with the amount $99 at time τ . When the interpretation is the empty set, no transaction is executed.
We further assume that when the interpretation of the predicate symbol trans is nonempty, the registers cid, tid, and
sum store (a) the transaction’s customer, (b) the transaction identifier, and (c) the transferred amount, respectively. If
the interpretation is the empty set, then the registers store a dummy value, representing undefinedness.
The variables c , t , a, t ′, and a′ are frozen to the respective register values. For example, c is frozen to the value stored
in the register cid at each point in time and is used to identify subsequent transactions from this customer. Also note
that, for instance, the variables t and t ′ are frozen to values stored in the registers tid at different times. The freeze
quantifier can be seen as a weak form of the standard first-order quantifiers [Henzinger 1990]. Since each register stores
exactly one value at any time, it is irrelevant whether we quantify existentially or universally over a register’s value. 
Let D—the data domain—be a nonempty set of values. Furthermore, let Σ be the set of the pairs (σ , ϱ), where σ is a
function over P with σ (p) ⊆ Dι(p) for p ∈ P and ϱ is a function over R with ϱ(r ) ∈ D for r ∈ R. Intuitively, σ interprets
the predicate symbols at the given time point and ϱ provides the values of the registers in R. MTL↓’s Boolean semantics
is defined inductively over the formula structure. We define a function φ 7→ Jw, i,ν |= φK ∈ 2, for a given timed wordw
over Σ, i ∈ N, and a valuation ν : V → D. Letw = (τ0, (σ0, ϱ0)) (τ1, (σ1, ϱ1)) . . . .
Jw, i,ν |= tK := t
Jw, i,ν |= p(x)K := 
t if ν (x) ∈ σi (p)
f otherwise
Jw, i,ν |= ↓rx . φK := Jw, i,ν [x 7→ ϱi (r )] |= φK
Jw, i,ν |= ¬φK := ¬Jw, i,ν |= φK
Jw, i,ν |= φ ∨ψ K := Jw, i,ν |= φK ∨ Jw, i,ν |= ψ K
Jw, i,ν |=  I φK := i > 0 ∧ τi − τi−1 ∈ I ∧ Jw, i − 1,ν |= φKJw, i,ν |= #I φK := τi+1 − τi ∈ I ∧ Jw, i + 1,ν |= φKJw, i,ν |= φ SI ψ K := ∨
j ∈N, j≤i
(
τi − τj ∈ I ∧ Jw, j,ν |= ψ K ∧ ∧
j<k≤i
Jw,k,ν |= φK)
Jw, i,ν |= φ UI ψ K := ∨
j ∈N, j≥i
(
τj − τi ∈ I ∧ Jw, j,ν |= ψ K ∧ ∧
i≤k<j
Jw,k,ν |= φK)
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Note that we abuse notation here and identify the logic’s constant symbol t with the Boolean value t, and the connec-
tives ¬ and ∨ with the corresponding logical operators. Furthermore, we use standard conventions, for example, p(x)
abbreviates p(x1, . . . ,xι(p)) and ν (x) ∈ σi (p) abbreviates
(
ν (x1), . . . ,ν (xι(p))
) ∈ σi (p). Finally, note that the disjunction
in the UI case is infinite.
3 METRIC TEMPORAL LOGIC FOR MONITORING
In this section, we present a three-valued semantics for MTL↓ that conservatively approximates the logic’s standard
Boolean semantics. Our new semantics is defined with monitoring in mind in that it accounts for knowledge gaps that
arise during monitoring, which may be fully or partially filled later. We first introduce in Section 3.1 the models of
our semantics, which support reasoning about incomplete traces. Afterwards, in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, we present the
semantics and establish basic properties about it. We conclude by defining correctness requirements for monitoring in
Section 3.4.
3.1 Observations
A monitor usually has only partial knowledge about the behavior of the system it monitors. For instance, for nontermi-
nating systems, a monitor is only aware of a finite prefix of the system’s behavior. Thus, when modeling this behavior
as a timed word, the monitor only knows a finite prefix of this word. Moreover, when communication to the monitor is
unreliable or delayed, the monitor may not even have the entire finite prefix, but only portions thereof. In the following,
we introduce a notion of observations that supports reasoning based on partial information about the system behavior.
Throughout this section, we fix an alphabet Σ. We require that Σ is partially ordered and denote the partial order byĂ.
Intuitively, a Ă b means that a carries less information than b. Furthermore, we require that Σ has a least element a0.
Definition 3.1. The set of observations Obs(Σ) is inductively defined.
– The word
([0,∞),a0) of length 1 is in Obs(Σ).
– If the wordw is in Obs(Σ), then the word obtained by applying one of the following transformations tow is in Obs(Σ).
(T1) Some letter (I ,a) ofw , with |I | > 1, is replaced by the three-letter word(
I ∩ [0,τ ),a) ({τ },a) (I ∩ (τ ,∞),a) ,
where τ ∈ I and τ > 0. If τ = 0, then (I ,a) is replaced by the two-letter word ({τ },a) (I ∩ (τ ,∞),a) .
(T2) Some letter (I ,a) ofw , with |I | > 1 and I bounded, is removed.
(T3) Some letter (I ,a) ofw , with |I | = 1, is replaced by (I ,a′) with a Ă a′.
For an observation w of length n ∈ N, let pos(w) := {0, . . . ,n − 1}. We call i ∈ pos(w) a time point in w if the
interval Ii of the letter at position i inw is a singleton. In this case, the element of Ii is the timestamp of the time point i ,
denoted by tsw (i).
Given the inductive definition of the set Obs(Σ), the partial order over Σ naturally extends to a partial order on
observations. We thereby obtain the following refinement relation on observations.
Definition 3.2. Forw,w ′ ∈ Obs(Σ), letw Ă1 w ′ iffw ′ is obtained fromw by one of the transformations (T1), (T2), or
(T3). The observationw ′ refines the observationw ifw Ď w ′, where Ď is the reflexive-transitive closure of Ă1.
Example 3.3. Recall the set of predicates symbols P = {trans} and the set of registers R = {cid, tid, sum} from
Example 2.1. For brevity, we ignore here the rigid interpretations of the constant symbol 2000 and the binary predicate
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symbol ≥. Furthermore, recall the data domain D that contains all customers and the positive integers. Let Σ be the
alphabet consisting of the pairs (σ , ϱ) with σ : P ↛ 2D×D×D and ϱ : R ↛ D. Note that the partial orders on the two
sets of partial functions extend to a partial order on Σ and that ([ ], [ ]) is Σ’s least element.
A monitor’s knowledge can be represented by observations over Σ. A monitor’s initial knowledge is represented
by the observation w0 =
([0,∞), ([ ], [ ])) . Suppose that a transaction of $99 with identifier 42 from Alice is ex-
ecuted at time 3.0. The monitor’s initial knowledge w0 is then updated by the transformations (T1) and (T3) to
w1 =
([0, 3.0), ([ ], [ ])) ({3.0}, (σ , ϱ)) ((3.0,∞), ([ ], [ ])) , where σ (trans) = {(Alice, 42, 99)} and ϱ = [cid 7→ Alice, tid 7→
42, sum 7→ 99]. Note thatw0 Ď w1.
If the monitor also receives the information that no action occurred in the interval [0, 3.0), then its updated knowledge
is represented by the observation
({3.0}, (σ , ϱ)) ((3.0,∞), ([ ], [ ])) , obtained fromw1 by the transformation (T2). The
information that no action has occurred in an interval can be communicated explicitly or implicitly by the monitored
system to the monitor, for instance, by attaching a sequence number to each action. See Section 7.2.1 for details. 
We remark that the interval associated with the last letter of an observation is always unbounded. This reflects that
a monitor is unaware of what it will observe in the future. More generally, a letter (I ,a) of an observation with |I | > 1
represents a knowledge gap of the monitor. In particular, a is the alphabet’s least element a0, meaning that nothing is
known about the interpretation of the predicate symbols and the register values during the time period I . Finally, note
that according to Definition 3.1, knowledge gaps (I ,a) can completely disappear (T2), or can be partially resolved by
adding a new time point where the interval is split (T1), where (T3) can add additional knowledge to the new time
point by replacing a with a letter that is larger with respect to the alphabet’s partial order. For simplicity, we do not
include a transformation in Definition 3.1 that allows one to shrink nonsingleton intervals, that is, a transformation
that replaces a letter (I ,a) with |I | > 1 by a letter (I ′,a) with |I ′ | > 1, I ′ ⊊ I , and I ′ is unbounded if I is unbounded.
3.2 Three-valued Semantics
MTL↓’s models under the three-valued semantics are observations, which represent a monitor’s partial knowledge
about the system behavior at a given point in time. This is in contrast to the models for the standard Boolean semantics
for MTL, which are timed words and capture the complete system behavior in the limit.
For defining MTL↓’s three-valued semantics, we fix a data domain D, which is a nonempty set of values with ⊥ < D.
Furthermore, let Σ be the alphabet consisting of the letters (σ , ϱ), where σ and ϱ are partial functions, namely, σ : P ↛⋃
p∈P 2D
ι(p) and ϱ : R ↛ D. Note that Σ is partially ordered and its least element is ([ ], [ ]). Analogous to the definition of
MTL↓’s Boolean semantics in Section 2, we define the logic’s three-valued semantics by a functionφ 7→ Jw, i,ν |≈ φK ∈ 3,
for a given observationw ∈ Obs(Σ), i ∈ pos(w), and a partial valuation ν : V ↛ D. We define this function inductively
over the formula structure. In the following, we assume that w =
(
I0, (σ0, ϱ0)
)
. . .
(
In−1, (σn−1, ϱn−1)
)
and abuse
notation by identifying the logic’s constant symbol t with the Boolean value t ∈ 3, and the connectives ¬ and ∨ with
the corresponding three-valued logical operators in Table 1. The nontemporal cases are as expected.
Jw, i,ν |≈ tK := t
Jw, i,ν |≈ p(x)K :=

t if x ∈ def(ν ), p ∈ def(σi ), and ν (x) ∈ σi (p)
f if x ∈ def(ν ), p ∈ def(σi ), and ν (x) < σi (p)
⊥ otherwise
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Jw, i,ν |≈ ↓rx . φK := 
Jw, i,ν [x 7→ ϱi (r )] |≈ φK if x ∈ def(ϱi )Jw, i,ν [x 7→ ⊥] |≈ φK otherwise
Jw, i,ν |≈ ¬φK := ¬Jw, i,ν |≈ φK
Jw, i,ν |≈ φ ∨ψ K := Jw, i,ν |≈ φK ∨ Jw, i,ν |≈ ψ K
The temporal cases are less straightforward. In particular, the definition must account for letters in w where a
nonsingleton interval represents knowledge gaps that may either disappear or may be replaced by multiple letters in a
refinement. We make use of the auxiliary functions tpw : pos(w) → 3 and mcw, I : pos(w) × pos(w) → 3, which are as
follows for the observationw and an interval I .
tpw (i) :=

t if |Ii | = 1
⊥ otherwise
and mcw, I (i, j) :=

t if Ii − Ij , ∅ and Ii − Ij ⊆ I
f if (Ii − Ij ) ∩ I = ∅
⊥ otherwise
We use tpw to check whether a position is a time point (hence, the name “tp”), and we use mcw, I to check whether
the metric constraint I of a temporal connective is valid or unsatisfiable between two positions inw (hence, the name
“mc”). Note that if mcw, I (i, j) = ⊥, then the metric constraint between the positions i and j could either be satisfied or
violated, depending on some timestamps τ ∈ Ii and τ ′ ∈ Ij .
The semantics of the temporal connectives SI and UI is defined as follows.
Jw, i,ν |≈ φ SI ψ K := ∨
j ∈pos(w ), j≤i
(
tpw (j) ∧ mcw, I (i, j) ∧ Jw, j,ν |≈ ψ K ∧ ∧
j<k≤i
(
tpw (k) → Jw,k,ν |≈ φK) )
Jw, i,ν |≈ φ UI ψ K := ∨
j ∈pos(w ), j≥i
(
tpw (j) ∧ mcw, I (j, i) ∧ Jw, j,ν |≈ ψ K ∧ ∧
i≤k<j
(
tpw (k) → Jw,k,ν |≈ φK) )
We comment on the definitions for φ SI ψ and φ UI ψ . First, note that j ranges over so-called “anchor” positions and k
ranges over so-called “continuation” positions. For a position j to be a “valid” anchor position, j must be a time point,
which is the case when tpw (j) = t. Otherwise, tpw (j) = ⊥. Using the truth value f instead of ⊥ would be incorrect since
it is not yet known whether a refinement ofw will contain a time point with a timestamp in Ij . Furthermore, note that
the function mcw, I returns ⊥ if it is unknown inw whether the formula’s metric constraint is always satisfied or never
satisfied for the positions i and j . Finally, suppose that a position k between j and i is an “invalid” continuation position,
that is, φ’s truth value at k is f. If the interval Ik is not a singleton, then tpw (k) “downgrades” this truth value to ⊥,
since it will be irrelevant in refinements ofw that do not contain any time points with a timestamp in Ik .
Finally, we define the semantics of the temporal connectives  I and #I as
Jw, i,ν |≈  I φK := c0 ∨ c−1 ∨ c−2 and Jw, i,ν |≈ #I φK := c0 ∨ c1 ∨ c2
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with
ck :=

mcw, I (i, i) ∧ Jw, i,ν |≈ φK ∧ ¬tpw (i) if k = 0 and I , {0},
mcw, I (i, i − 1) ∧ Jw, i − 1,ν |≈ φK ∧ tpw (i − 1) ∧ tpw (i) if k = −1 and i ≥ 1,
mcw, I (i + 1, i) ∧ Jw, i + 1,ν |≈ φK ∧ tpw (i + 1) ∧ tpw (i) if k = 1 and i < n − 1,
mcw, I (i, i − 2) ∧ Jw, i − 2,ν |≈ φK ∧ ¬tpw (i − 1) if k = −2 and i ≥ 2,
mcw, I (i + 2, i) ∧ Jw, i + 2,ν |≈ φK ∧ ¬tpw (i + 1) if k = 2 and i < n − 2,
f otherwise.
We comment on the definition for#I φ with i < n − 2; the other cases are analogous or restricted cases of this one. One
might expect that the conjunct c1 is already sufficient. However, having only c1 could result in the wrong truth value f
for #I φ at i when Jw, i + 1,ν |≈ φK = f. If, for example, |Ii | > 1 then it is still possible to satisfy #I φ when refining
the observationw at Ii . A refinement ofw may consist of two time points with the timestamps τ and τ ′ in Ii , where
τ ′ − τ ∈ I and φ is true at the time point with timestamp τ ′. The conjunct c0 takes care of such a refinement at i . The
conjunct c2 is necessary when |Ii+1 | > 1. In this case i and i + 2 are time points inw . The observationw may be refined
by removing the letter at position i + 1, resulting in an observation wherew ’s letter at position i + 2 is the successor of
w ’s letter at position i . Note that c0 and c2 can be f or ⊥ but never t because of the negative tpw literals occurring in c0
and c2. Furthermore, again because of the tpw literals, we have that c0 = c2 = f whenever c1 = t. Finally, observe that
mcw, {0}(i, i) , f. However, the metric constraint {0} is only satisfiable for time points that have equal timestamps and
we require that timestamps are strictly increasing. Hence, the additional constraint I , {0} is needed when k = 0.
Observe that it may be the case that Jw, i,ν |≈ φK ∈ 2 when i is not a time point inw . A trivial example is when φ = t.
In a refinement ofw , it might turn out that there are no time points with timestamps in Ii , and hence a monitor should
not output a verdict for the specification φ at position i inw . We address this artifact by downgrading (with respect to
the partial order ≺) a Boolean truth value Jw, i,ν |≈ φK to ⊥ when i is not a time point. To this end, we introduce the
following variant of the semantics.
Definition 3.4. For a formula φ, an observationw , τ ∈ Q≥0, and a partial valuation ν , we define
[w,τ ,ν |≈ φ] :=

Jw, i,ν |≈ φK if τ is the timestamp of some time point i ∈ pos(w), and
⊥ otherwise.
3.3 Properties
Our first theorem shows that MTL↓’s three-valued semantics conservatively approximates its standard Boolean
semantics. Intuitively speaking, if a formula φ evaluates to a Boolean value for an observation at time τ ∈ Q≥0, then φ
has the same Boolean value at time τ for any timed word that refines the observation. To state the theorem, we need
the following definitions. A timed wordw ′ refines an observationw , writtenw Ď w ′ for short, if for every j ∈ N, there
is some i ∈ pos(w), such that τj ∈ Ii , σi Ď σ ′j , and ϱi Ď ϱ ′j , where (Iℓ , (σℓ , ϱℓ)) and (τk , (σ ′k , ϱ ′k )), for ℓ ∈ pos(w) and
k ∈ N, are the letters ofw andw ′, respectively. Furthermore, similar to Definition 3.4, we define for τ ∈ Q≥0, a timed
wordw , a valuation ν , and a formula φ,
[w,τ ,ν |= φ] :=

Jw, j,ν |= φK if the jth letter ofw is (τ , (σ , ϱ)), and
⊥ otherwise.
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Theorem 3.5. Let φ be a formula, µ a partial valuation, ν a total valuation, u an observation, v a timed word, and
τ ∈ Q≥0. If u Ď v and µ Ď ν , then [u,τ , µ |≈ φ] ⪯ [v,τ ,ν |= φ].
Proof. Let (Ii , (σi , ϱi )) and (τj , (σ ′j , ϱ ′j )), for i ∈ pos(u) and j ∈ N, be the letters of u and v , respectively. Since u Ď v ,
there is a function π : N→ pos(u) such that (R1) τj ∈ Iπ (j), (R2) σπ (j) Ď σ ′j , and (R3) ϱπ (j) Ď ϱ ′j , for every j ∈ N. It is
easy to see that π is monotonic.
We prove by structural induction on φ that for every i ′ ∈ N and partial valuations µ and ν with def(ν ) = V and
µ Ď ν , it holds that Ju,π (i ′), µ |≈ φK ⪯ Jv, i ′,ν |= φK. The theorem easily follows from this statement. Let i ′ ∈ N, and
let µ and ν be partial valuations with def(ν ) = V and µ Ď ν . Furthermore, let i = π (i ′). Note that the statement clearly
holds for Ju, i, µ |≈ φK = ⊥. Hence, it suffices to show that Ju, i, µ |≈ φK = Jv, i ′,ν |= φK, provided that Ju, i, µ |≈ φK ∈ 2.
Base cases. The case φ = t is trivial. Consider the case φ = p(x), for some p ∈ P . As Ju, i,ν |≈ p(x)K ∈ 2, it holds that
x ∈ def(ν ) and p ∈ def(σi ). It follows from the theorem’s premise that µ(x) = ν (x) and from (R2) that σi (p) = σ ′i′(p).
Thus Ju, i,ν |≈ p(x)K = Jv, i ′,ν |= p(x)K.
Inductive cases. The cases where φ is of the form ¬α or α ∨ β are straightforward and are omitted. We also omit the
cases for  I α , #I α , and α SI β , since they are similar to the case α UI β .
First, assume that φ is of the form ↓rx . ψ . Let η = µ[x 7→ ϱi (r )] if r ∈ def(ϱi ), and η = µ[x 7→ ⊥] otherwise.
Similarly, let η′ = ν [x 7→ ϱ ′i′(r )] if r ∈ def(ϱ ′i′), and η′ = µ[x 7→ ⊥] otherwise. By (R3), we have that if r ∈ def(ϱi ), then
r ∈ def(ϱ ′i′) and ϱi (r ) = ϱ ′i′(r ), and thus η(x) = η′(x). Furthermore, if r < def(ϱi ), then x < def(η). Hence, η Ď η′. It
follows from the induction hypothesis that Ju, i,η |≈ ψ K ⪯ Jv, i ′,η′ |= ψ K and therefore Ju, i, µ |≈ φK = Jv, i ′,ν |= φK.
Assume that φ is of the form α UI β . We consider first the case Ju, i, µ |≈ α UI βK = t. By definition, there is some
j ∈ pos(u) with j ≥ i such that tpu (j) = t, mcu, I (i, j) = t, Ju, j, µ |≈ βK = t, and tpu (k) → Ju,k, µ |≈ αK = t, for
all k with i ≤ k < j. As j is a time point in u, π (j ′) = j, for some j ′ ∈ N. From (R1), we have that τj′ = tsu (j).
As mcu, I (i, j) = t and Ij = {τj′}, we have that τj′ − τ ∈ I , for all τ ∈ Ii . From (R1), we have that τi′ ∈ Ii . Thus,
τj′ − τi′ ∈ I (I1). From the induction hypothesis, Ju, j, µ |≈ βK ⪯ Jv, j ′,ν |= βK. Hence, Jv, j ′,ν |= βK = t (I2). We
also have that Ju,π (k ′), µ |≈ αK ⪯ Jv,k ′,ν |= αK, for any k ′ ∈ N. Let k ′ ∈ N such that i ′ ≤ k ′ < j ′, and let
k = π (k ′). By the monotonicity of π , we have that i ≤ k ≤ j. Since j is a time point in u we also have that k < j. As
tpu (k) → Ju,k, µ |≈ αK = t and tpu is never f by definition, we have that Ju,k, µ |≈ αK = t. Then Jv,k ′, µ |= αK = t (I3).
Summing up, from (I1), (I2), (I3), and as k ′ was chosen arbitrarily, we obtain that Jv, i ′,ν |= α UI βK = t.
The case Ju, i, µ |≈ α UI βK = f is as follows. Note that each disjunct in the definition of Ju, i, µ |≈ α UI βK is f. We fix
an arbitrary j ′ ≥ i ′ and let j = π (j ′). It holds that tpu (j)∧mcu, I (j, i)∧Ju, j, µ |≈ βK∧∧i≤k<j (tpu (k) → Ju,k, µ |≈ αK) = f.
Since tpu (j) , f, one of the remaining conjuncts must be f.
(1) If mcu, I (i, j) = f, then τ ′ − τ ′′ < I , for all τ ′′ ∈ Ii and τ ′ ∈ Ij . From (R1), τi′ ∈ Ii and τj′ ∈ Ij , it follows that
τj′ − τi′ < I .
(2) If Ju, j, µ |≈ βK = f, then Jv, j ′,ν |= βK = f, by the induction hypothesis.
(3) If tpu (k) → Ju,k, µ |≈ αK = f, for some k with i ≤ k < j, then tpu (k) = t and Ju,k, µ |≈ αK = f. It follows as before
that there is a k ′ with i ′ ≤ k ′ < j ′ such that Jv,k ′,ν |= αK = f.
We have thus obtained that either τi′ − τj′ < I or one of the conjuncts of Jv, j ′,ν |= βK ∧∧i′≤k ′<j′Jv,k ′,ν |= αK is f. In
other words, if j ′ is such that τj′ − τi′ ∈ I , then Jv, j ′,ν |= βK∧∧i′≤k ′<j′Jv,k ′,ν |= αK = f. As j ′ was chosen arbitrarily,
we conclude that Jv, i ′,ν |= α UI βK = f. □
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The next theorem states that MTL↓’s three-valued semantics is monotonic in Ď (on observations and partial
valuations) and ⪯ (on truth values). This property is crucial for monitoring, since it guarantees that a verdict output for
an observation stays valid for refined observations.
Theorem 3.6. Let φ be a formula, µ and ν partial valuations, u and v observations, and τ ∈ Q≥0. If u Ď v and µ Ď ν ,
then [u,τ , µ |≈ φ] ⪯ [v,τ ,ν |≈ φ].
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 3.5 and details are thus omitted. We just note that we make use of
the following properties (R1′), (R2′), and (R3′), which correspond to the ones used in the proof of Theorem 3.5.
Letw andw ′ be observations with letters
(
Ii , (σi , ϱi )
)
and, respectively,
(
I ′j , (σ ′j , ϱ ′j )
)
, for i ∈ pos(w) and j ∈ pos(w ′).
We claim that ifw Ď w ′, then there is a monotonic function π : pos(w ′) → pos(w) with the following properties.
(R1′) I ′j ⊆ Iπ (j), for all j ∈ pos(w ′).
(R2′) σπ (j) Ď σ ′j , for all j ∈ pos(w ′).
(R3′) ϱπ (j) Ď ϱ ′j , for all j ∈ pos(w ′).
Ifw = w ′ then take π to be the identity. Ifw ′ is obtained fromw using one of the transformations, that is, ifw Ă1 w ′,
then, for each transformation it is easy to construct a function π that has the stated properties. Ifw Ĺ w ′, then there is
a sequence (wi )0≤i≤n of observations, with n > 1, such that w = w0 Ă1 w1 Ă1 · · · Ă1 wn = w ′. From the previous
observation, there is a sequence of functions πi : pos(wi ) → pos(wi−1), with 1 ≤ i ≤ n, each having the stated properties.
The functions’ composition π = π1 ◦ · · · ◦ πn also has these properties. □
We next investigate the decision problem that underlies monitoring. Note that we do not require that the interpre-
tations of the predicate symbols are finite relations. However, for monitoring, the relations must be decidable, and
a monitor needs an algorithm for performing membership checks. For the following theorem, we assume that the
membership of a tuple in a predicate symbol’s interpretation at a time point can be checked in PSPACE.
Theorem 3.7. For a formula φ, an observationw , a partial valuation ν , τ ∈ Q≥0, and a truth value b ∈ 2, the problem
of whether [w,τ ,ν |≈ φ] equals b is PSPACE-complete.
Proof. We first show that the problem is PSPACE-hard by reducing the satisfiability problem for quantified Boolean
logic (QBL) to it. Let α be a closed QBL formula over the propositions p1, . . . ,pn . We define the set P of predicate
symbols as {P1, . . . , Pn }, where each predicate symbol has arity 1. Moreover, let R := {r } and D := {0, 1}, and letw be
the observation ({0},σ , ϱ0) ({1}, (σ , ϱ1)) ({3}, ([ ], [ ])) ((3,∞), ([ ], [ ])) ,
with σ (Pi ) = {1}, for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, and ϱi (r ) = i , for i ∈ {0, 1}. Finally, we translate the QBL formula α to an
MTL↓ formula α∗ as follows.
p∗i := Pi (xi ) (¬β)∗ := ¬β∗ (β ∨ γ )∗ := β∗ ∨ γ ∗ (∃pi . β)∗ := ■ 2[0,1] ↓xi . β∗ (∀pi . β)∗ := ■ 2[0,1] ↓xi . β∗
It is easy to see that α is satisfiable iff [w, 0, [ ] |≈ α∗] = t.
We only sketch the problem’s membership in PSPACE. Note that w is finite. If there is no time point in w with
timestamp τ , then [w,τ ,ν |≈ φ] = ⊥. Suppose that i ∈ pos(w) is a time point inw with timestamp τ . A computation ofφ’s
truth value at position i can be easily obtained from the inductive definition of the satisfaction relation |≈. Note, however,
that the space consumed by naively unfolding the semantic definitions would in general not be polynomially bounded.
One reason is that subformulas may occur multiple times in the unfolding for different time points and valuations.
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Instead, we must carry out this computation by a depth-first traversal when unfolding the semantic definitions to stay
in PSPACE. Furthermore, note that our additional assumption on the membership checks allows us to determine in
PSPACE the truth value of an atomic formula at a time point. □
In a propositional setting, the corresponding decision problem can be solved in polynomial time using dynamic
programming, where the truth values at the positions of an observation are propagated up the formula structure. Note
that the truth value of a proposition at a position is given by the observation’s letter at that position. This is in contrast
to MTL↓, where atomic formulas can have free variables and their truth values at the positions in an observationw
may depend on the data values stored in the registers and frozen to these variables at different time points ofw . Before
truth values are propagated up, the bindings of variables to data values must be propagated down.
3.4 Monitoring Correctness Requirements
A monitor for a specification iteratively receives information about the system behavior. Abstractly speaking, the
monitor’s input is an infinite sequence (ini )i ∈N, where ini describes a part of the system behavior and is received by the
monitor in its ith iteration. The monitor’s output is an infinite sequence (outi )i ∈N, where outi is the output in iteration i
describing when the monitor’s specification is satisfied or violated. In the following, we concretize a monitor’s input
and output for our setting and define correctness requirements for monitoring. Note that we assume that a monitor
never terminates and that it infinitely often receives information about the system behavior. This assumption is invalid
if, for instance, the system observed by the monitor ever terminates. Nevertheless, we make this assumption to simplify
matters and it is easy to adapt our definitions and results to the general case.
We first turn to a monitor’s input, which is a sequence of observations (wi )i ∈N. That is, we view the observationwi
as the input to the monitor at iteration i ∈ N. In practice, a monitor would receive at iteration i > 0 a message that
describes just the differences between wi−1 and wi . Furthermore, note that the wi s can be understood as abstract
descriptions of the monitor’s state over time, representing the monitor’s knowledge about the system behavior, where
w0 represents the monitor’s initial knowledge. Also note that if the timed word v is the system behavior in the limit,
thenwi Ď v , for all i ∈ N, assuming that components do not send bogus messages. However, for every i ∈ N, there are
infinitely many timed words u withwi Ď u. Since messages sent to the monitor can be lost, it can even be the case that
there is a timed word u with u , v andwi Ď u, for all i ∈ N.
Definition 3.8. The infinite sequence w¯ = (wi )i ∈N of observations is valid ifw0 =
([0,∞), ([ ], [ ])) andwi Ĺ wi+1,
for all i ∈ N.
We turn to a monitor’s output. Based on the input (wi )i ∈N, the monitor outputs in each iteration i ∈ N a set Vi of
verdicts, which is a finite set of pairs (τ ,b) with τ ∈ Q≥0 and b ∈ 2. Intuitively, τ is the time at which the specification
has the Boolean value b.
Definition 3.9. Let φ be a closed formula, w¯ = (wi )i ∈N a valid observation sequence, and V¯ = (Vi )i ∈N a sequence of
verdict sets.
(i) V¯ is observationally sound for w¯ and φ if for all partial valuations ν and i ∈ N, whenever (τ ,b) ∈ Vi then
[wi ,τ ,ν |≈ φ] = b.
(ii) V¯ is observationally complete for w¯ and φ if for all partial valuations ν , i ∈ N, and τ ∈ Q≥0, if [wi ,τ ,ν |≈ φ] ∈ 2
then (τ ,b) ∈ ⋃j≤i Vj , for some b ∈ 2.
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We say that a monitor is observationally sound if for all valid observation sequences w¯ and closed formulas φ, its
sequence of verdict sets is observationally sound for w¯ and φ. The definition of a monitor being observationally complete
is analogous.
It follows from Theorem 3.7 that monitors for MTL↓ exist that are both observationally sound and complete. In
Sections 4 and 5, we present such monitoring algorithms in detail. In the remainder of this section, we relate the
correctness requirements from Definition 3.9 to requirements that demand that a monitor outputs a verdict as soon as
the specification has the same Boolean value on every extension of the monitor’s current knowledge. Such requirements
are stronger and achieving them can be hard or even impossible for nontrivial specification languages. In particular, we
show that monitors satisfying such a requirement do not exist for MTL↓. We start with an example that illustrates the
differences on the verdicts for monitoring.
Example 3.10. Consider the formula φ = 2(p ∧ 2¬p). Note that under the classical Boolean semantics, φ is logically
equivalent to f, however not under the three-valued semantics. For example, Jw, 0,ν |≈ φK = ⊥, forw = ([0,∞), ([ ], [ ]))
and any valuation ν . Given a valid observation sequence w¯ , an observationally sound and complete monitor for w¯ and φ
first outputs the verdict (0, f) for the minimal i such thatwi contains a letter that assigns p to false. In contrast, a sound
and complete monitor for the classical Boolean semantics (see Definition 3.11 below) must immediately output the
verdict f. 
For an observationw , we defineUw := {v | v a timed word withw Ď v}. Intuitively,Uw contains the timed words
that are compatible with the reported system behavior that a monitor received so far, represented byw .
Definition 3.11. Let φ be a closed formula, w¯ a valid observation sequence, and V¯ a sequence of verdict sets.
(i) V¯ is sound for w¯ and φ if for all valuations ν and i ∈ N, whenever (τ ,b) ∈ Vi , then
c
v ∈Uwi [v,τ ,ν |= φ] = b, that
is, the meet ⋏ of the truth values in the lower semilattice (3,≺) is b.
(ii) V¯ is complete for w¯ and φ if for all valuations ν , i ∈ N, and τ ∈ Q≥0, whenever
c
v ∈Uwi [v,τ ,ν |= φ] ∈ 2, then
(τ ,b) ∈ ⋃j≤i Vj , for some b ∈ 2.
We say that a monitor is sound if for all valid observation sequences w¯ and closed formulas φ, its sequence of verdict
sets is sound for w¯ and φ. The definition of a monitor being complete is analogous.
With the help of Theorem 3.5, we prove that the completeness requirement from Definition 3.9 is indeed a weaker
notion than the completeness requirement from Definition 3.11, while the soundness requirement from Definition 3.11
offers the same correctness guarantees as the one from Definition 3.9.
Theorem 3.12. LetM be a monitor.
(a) IfM is observationally sound, thenM is sound.
(b) IfM is complete, thenM is observationally complete.
Proof. Let V¯ be the sequence of verdict sets thatM iteratively outputs for φ and w¯ .
We first prove (a). Assume thatM is observationally sound. Let ν be a total valuation, i ∈ N, τ ∈ Q≥0, and b ∈ 2 such
that (τ ,b) ∈ Vi . Then, by definition, [wi ,τ ,ν |≈ φ] = b. For v ∈ Uwi , we have thatwi Ď v . By Theorem 3.5, we obtain
that [v,τ ,ν |= φ] = b. It follows thatcv ∈Uwi [v,τ ,ν |= φ] = b. We conclude thatM is sound.
It remains to prove (b). Assume that M is complete. Let ν be a partial valuation, i ∈ N, and τ ∈ Q≥0 such that
[wi ,τ ,ν |= φ] = b ′, for some b ′ ∈ 2. Let ν ′ be a total valuation with ν Ď ν ′ and v ∈ Uwi . As wi Ď v , we obtain
from Theorem 3.5 that [v,τ ,ν ′ |= φ] = b ′. As v was chosen arbitrarily, we get cv ∈Uwi [v,τ ,ν ′ |= φ] = b ′. From
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M’s completeness, it follows that there are b ∈ 2 and j ∈ N with j ≤ i such that (τ ,b) ∈ Vj . We conclude that M is
observationally complete. □
The correctness requirements in Definition 3.11 are related to the use of a three-valued “runtime-verification”
semantics for a specification language as introduced by Bauer et al. [2011] for LTL and adopted by other runtime-
verification approaches, for example, the one by Bauer et al. [2015]. Both a sound and complete monitor, and a monitor
implementing the three-valued “runtime-verification” semantics output a verdict as soon as the specification has the
same Boolean value on every extension of the monitor’s current knowledge. However, as we explain next, efficient
monitors can be hard to achieve or may not even exist for nontrivial specification languages.
Remark 3.13. Having a sound and complete monitorM for a specification language is at least as hard as checking
satisfiability for this language. For instance, we can use a sound and complete monitorM to check satisfiability for MTL↓
as follows. We runM for the closed formula φ whose satisfiability we want to check. We refineM’s initial knowledge
by the transformations (T1) and (T2) and add the first time point with the timestamp 0.0. The formula φ is unsatisfiable
under the standard Boolean semantics iffM’s verdict set V1 contains (0.0, f). Already MTL with the standard Boolean
semantics is undecidable [Ouaknine and Worrell 2006] and many of its nontrivial decidable fragments have a high
complexity. Recall that the satisfiability problem for LTL is PSPACE-complete [Sistla and Clarke 1985].
Some monitoring approaches try to compensate for this complexity burden with a preprocessing step. For in-
stance, Bauer et al. [2011] translates an LTL formula into an automaton prior to monitoring. The resulting automaton
can be directly used for sound and complete monitoring in environments where messages are neither delayed nor
lost. However, there are no obvious extensions that handle out-of-order message delivery. Furthermore, not every
specification language has such a corresponding automaton model and, for those where translations are known, the
automaton construction can be very costly. For LTL, the size of the automaton is already in the worst case doubly
exponential in the size of the formula [Bauer et al. 2011]. 
4 MONITORING IN THE PROPOSITIONAL SETTING
In this section, we present an observationally sound and complete online algorithm for MTL. We extend the algorithm
in the next section to MTL↓, where we also provide the proof details. To support scalable monitoring, the verdict
computation is incremental in that the results from previous computations are reused whenever observations are refined
by the transformations (T1), (T2), and (T3) fromDefinition 3.1. We start with the algorithm’s main procedure (Section 4.1).
Afterwards, we describe the state the algorithm maintains (Section 4.2) and further algorithmic details (Section 4.3).
4.1 Main Procedure
The pseudocode of the monitor’s top-level procedure is shown in Listing 1. In a nutshell, after the monitor initializes its
state, it enters a nonterminating loop. In each loop iteration, the monitor receives a message, updates its state according
to the information extracted from the message, and outputs the computed verdicts. Recall from Section 3.4 that each
message received describes the “delta” between two subsequent observations in a valid observation sequence (wi )i ∈N.
The message format and therefore how the monitor obtains the necessary information from a message and its current
state are system-dependent. A possible realization is given in Section 7.
We provide a brief description of the procedures used by the monitor’s top-level procedure. The procedure Init
initializes the monitor’s state; see Section 4.2 for details. The procedure ReceiveMessage receives a message, for
instance, over a channel or from a log file. The procedure UpdateKnowledge updates the monitor’s knowledge about
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procedureMonitorMTL(φ )
Init(φ )
loop
m := ReceiveMessage()
ts := UpdateKnowledge(m)
foreach t with t in ts do
case (T1): J , τ := DeltaT1(t )
AddTimePoint(φ , J , τ )
case (T2): K := DeltaT2(t )
RemoveInterval(K )
case (T3): τ , σ := DeltaT3(t )
foreach p with p ∈ def(σ ) do
PropagateTruthValue(p , {τ }, σ (p))
Listing 1. The monitor’s main loop for MTL.
the system behavior. This procedure also returns a list of the transformations that transform the observationwi−1 into
the observationwi in the ith iteration. The monitor uses the procedures DeltaT1, DeltaT2, and DeltaT3 to learn how
the observation is updated. Concretely, DeltaT1 returns the timestamp τ of a new time point and the interval J that is
split at τ . DeltaT2 returns the interval K of the letter that is removed from the observation. DeltaT3 returns the Boolean
values σ (p) of the newly assigned propositions p ∈ def(σ ) at the time point with the timestamp τ . The procedures
AddTimePoint, RemoveInterval, and PropagateTruthValue are central to the monitor. They update the monitor’s state.
For instance, PropagateTruthValue propagates the Boolean values of newly assigned propositions. Section 4.3 provides
algorithmic details for these three procedures.
Before we proceed, we introduce the following conventions that we use in the remainder of this section. Let φ be the
MTL formula that is monitored with propositions in P . The letter I ranges over the metric constraints of the temporal
connectives that occur in φ. The letters α , β , and γ range over elements in sub(φ). Furthermore, letw be an observation.
It ranges over the elements in the valid observation sequence (wi )i ∈N. The letters J , K , and H range over the intervals
that occur in letters of w . The lower case letters j, k , and h are the indexes of the letters in w with the intervals J ,
K , and H , respectively. We also simplify notation. We omit the partial valuation ν in Jw, i,ν |≈ γ K, that is, we only
write Jw, i |≈ γ K. Note that ν is irrelevant for MTL. We also assume that φ is not an atomic formula and subformulas
of φ are pairwise distinct. Both assumptions are without loss of generality. For example, the second one is met when
representing formulas as abstract syntax trees.
4.2 Monitor State
4.2.1 Reduction to Propositional Logic. At the core of the monitor is a mapping of MTL’s three-valued semantics
into propositional logic with the standard two-valued semantics. From a high-level perspective, the monitor’s state
comprises a representation of propositional formulas, which the monitor refines and simplifies whenever it receives
information about the system behavior. For readability, we start with a variant of these propositional formulas that is
close to the definition of MTL’s three-valued semantics.
The propositional formula Φγ , Jw over propositions of the form αK , tpK , andmc
H,K
I is defined as follows. Its inductive
definition follows the definition of MTL’s three-valued semantics in Section 3.2, where the propositions tpK andmcH,KI
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take the role of the corresponding functions.
Φ
γ , J
w :=

t if γ = t
p J if γ = p with p ∈ P
¬α J if γ = ¬α
α J ∨ β J if γ = α ∨ β∨
K ≤ J
(
tpK ∧mc J ,KI ∧ βK ∧
∧
K<H ≤ J (tpH → αH )
)
if γ = α SI β∨
K ≥ J
(
tpK ∧mcK, JI ∧ βK ∧
∧
J ≤H<K (tpH → αH )
)
if γ = α UI β
C J ,0w ∨C J ,−1w ∨C J ,−2w if γ =  I α
C J ,0w ∨C J ,+1w ∨C J ,+2w if γ = #I α
with
C J ,±ℓw :=

mc J , JI ∧ α J ∧ ¬tpJ if ℓ = 0 and I , {0}
mcmax{J , J±1},min{J , J±1}I ∧ α J±1 ∧ tpJ ∧ tpJ±1 if ℓ = ±1 and j ± 1 ∈ pos(w)
mcmax{J , J±2},min{J , J±2}I ∧ α J±2 ∧ ¬tpJ±1 if ℓ = ±2 and j ± 2 ∈ pos(w)
f otherwise
where J ± ℓ denotes the interval of w’s letter at the position j ± ℓ, provided that j ± ℓ ∈ pos(w). We also define the
substitution θw over the propositions of Φ
γ , J
w as follows.
αK 7→

t if Jw,k |≈ αK = t
f if Jw,k |≈ αK = f tpK 7→ t if |K | = 1 mcH,KI 7→

t if H − K , ∅ and H − K ⊆ I
f if (H − K) ∩ I = ∅
For the propositions not listed, θw is undefined. In general, a substitution θ is a partial function from propositions to
propositional formulas. Its homomorphic extension to propositional formulas is as expected, in particular, θ (Ψ) is the
propositional formula in which the occurrences of propositions p ∈ def(θ ) within the propositional formula Ψ are
replaced by θ (p), and the occurrences of propositions not in def(θ ) are unaltered.
Let ≡ denote semantic equivalence between propositional formulas. The following lemma connects γ ’s truth value
under MTL’s three-valued semantics with the propositional formula θw (Φγ , Jw ). Its proof is straightforward and omitted.
Lemma 4.1. The following two statements hold.
(i) If Jw, j |≈ γ K ∈ 2 then θw (Φγ , Jw ) ≡ Jw, j |≈ γ K.
(ii) If Jw, j |≈ γ K = ⊥ then θw (Φγ , Jw ) . t and θw (Φγ , Jw ) . f.
Note that the propositional formula θw (Φγ , Jw ) tells us more than the truth value Jw, j |≈ γ K. When θw (Φγ , Jw ) . b, for
b ∈ 2, we also know, in addition to Jw, j |≈ γ K = ⊥, what causes the uncertainty, namely, the corresponding counterparts
of the propositions that are not replaced by Boolean constants.
Next, we provide a tailored version of Φγ , Jw that is better suited for monitoring. Note that for the cases γ = α SI β
and γ = α UI β , at an anchor position K , the truth value Jw,k |≈ αK is irrelevant for Jw, j |≈ γ K. However, when |K | > 1
and when refining w by splitting K at some κ ∈ K , we obtain new anchor and continuation positions for which the
truth value Jw,k |≈ αK becomes relevant. With the tailored version Ψγ , Jw of Φγ , Jw we keep track of α ’s truth value at
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anchor positions K (cf. Example 4.2). The definition of Ψγ , Jw is as follows.
Ψ
γ , J
w :=

∨
K ≤ J
(
tpK ∧mc J ,KI ∧ βK ∧ (tp
K → αK ) ∧∧K<H ≤ J (tpH → αH )) if γ = α SI β∨
K ≥ J
(
tpK ∧mcK, JI ∧ βK ∧ (tp
K → αK ) ∧∧J ≤H<K (tpH → αH )) if γ = α UI β
Φ
γ , J
w otherwise
For the new propositions tpK , we extend the substitution θw by tpK 7→ f if |K | = 1.
Example 4.2. We illustrate the definitions of the propositional formulas Φγ , Jw and Ψ
γ , J
w , with γ = α Uβ , and the reason
for using θw (Ψγ , Jw ) for monitoring. Let w be an observation with the intervals J0 = [0,τ ), J1 = {τ }, and J2 = (τ ,∞),
and where α ’s and β ’s truth values are everywhere ⊥, except for position 1, where Jw, 1 |≈ αK = Jw, 1 |≈ βK = f. By
definition,
Φ
γ , J0
w =
(
tpJ0 ∧mc J0, J0I ∧ β J0
) ∨ (tpJ1 ∧mc J1, J0I ∧ β J1 ∧ (tpJ0 → α J0 )) ∨(
tpJ2 ∧mc J2, J0I ∧ β J2 ∧ (tpJ0 → α J0 ) ∧ (tpJ1 → α J1 )
)
,
Ψ
γ , J0
w =
(
tpJ0 ∧mc J0, J0I ∧ β J0 ∧ (tp
J0 → α J0 )) ∨ (tpJ1 ∧mc J1, J0I ∧ β J1 ∧ (tpJ1 → α J1 ) ∧ (tpJ0 → α J0 )) ∨(
tpJ2 ∧mc J2, J0I ∧ β J2 ∧ (tp
J2 → α J2 ) ∧ (tpJ1 → α J1 ) ∧ (tpJ0 → α J0 )) ,
and
θw = [α J1 7→ f, β J1 7→ f, tpJ1 7→ t, tpJ1 7→ f,mc J0, J0I 7→ t,mc
J1, J0
I 7→ t,mc
J2, J0
I 7→ t] .
Furthermore, letw ′ be the observation that is obtained fromw by the transformation (T1), where the interval J0 is split
at κ ∈ J0. That is, the intervals ofw ′ are K0 = [0,κ), K1 = {κ}, K2 = (κ,τ ), J1, and J2. Note that Jw ′, 3 |≈ αK = Jw ′, 3 |≈
βK = f and ⊥ anywhere else.
We have the following semantic equivalences.
θw (Φγ , J0w ) ≡ tpJ0 ∧ β J0 θw ′(Φγ ,K1w ′ ) ≡ βK1 ∨
(
tpK2 ∧ βK2 ∧ αK1 )
θw (Ψγ , J0w ) ≡ tpJ0 ∧ β J0 ∧ (tpJ0 → α J0 ) θw ′(Ψγ ,K1w ′ ) ≡ βK1 ∨
(
tpK2 ∧ βK2 ∧ (tpK2 → αK2 ) ∧ αK1 )
Observe that the proposition α J0 does not occur in θw (Φγ , J0w ). In contrast, α J0 occurs in θw (Ψγ , J0w ). With the subfor-
mula tpJ0 → α J0 , we store information about α ’s truth value in J0. In this example, since θw (tpJ0 → α J0 ) ≡ tpJ0 → α J0
we know that α ’s truth value in J0 is ⊥. If θw (tpJ0 → α J0 ) ≡ t, then we infer that α ’s truth value in J0 is t, and if
θw (tpJ0 → α J0 ) ≡ ¬tpJ0 , α ’s truth value in J0 is f. This information is relevant when splitting J0. In particular, it allows
us to obtain θw ′(Ψγ ,K1w ′ ) from θw (Ψ
γ , J0
w ) because all propositions that occur in θw ′(Ψγ ,K1w ′ ) originate from propositions
that already occur in θw (Ψγ , J0w ). 
The following lemma shows that Lemma 4.1 carries over to θw (Ψγ , Jw ). We omit its straightforward proof.
Lemma 4.3. For b ∈ 2,
θw (Φγ , Jw ) ≡ b iff θw (Ψγ , Jw ) ≡ b .
4.2.2 State Variables. The monitor’s state consists of the global variable observation and the global variables gateγ , J ,
whereγ is a nonatomic subformula of themonitored formulaφ and J is an interval. Themonitor stores in the state variable
observation its knowledge about the system behavior. This variable is updated in each iteration according to the message
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received by the procedure UpdateKnowledge (cf. Section 4.1). More concretely, in the monitor’s ith iteration, the state
variable observation equals the observationwi of the valid observation sequence (wi )i ∈N. The state variables gateγ , J
are used for the verdict computation. In particular, the monitor maintains the invariant gateγ , J ≡ θwi (Ψγ , Jwi ). Because
of the assumption that φ is not an atomic formula, the monitor only needs to maintain state variables gateγ ,K , where γ
is not atomic. Atomic formulas p only occur as propositions p J in the propositional formulas. We remark that we chose
the variable name gate since the propositional formulas can be seen as logic gates in a combinational circuit. Each such
gate computes a Boolean operation, where the input signals are the formula’s propositions.
For the sake of simplicity, we do not explicitly remove irrelevant state variables. Instead, we assume that they are
automatically “garbage collected.” For instance, a state variable gateγ , J with |J | = 1 becomes irrelevant when it is
semantically equivalent to a Boolean constant and its truth value has been propagated and, when γ is the monitored
formula φ, the verdict for J has been output. For simplicity, we also do not discard any knowledge about the system
behavior. In practice, one would remove irrelevant information from the state variable observation, for example, isolated
time points for which the monitor has already output a verdict.
Instead of fixing a concrete representation of the propositional formulas that are stored in the state variables gateγ , J ,
we provide an abstract interface for accessing and updating gateγ , J . In Section 4.3, we use this interface to describe the
monitor’s central algorithmic details, which are independent from an actual representation of the propositional formulas.
In Section 5.2, we describe a graph-based data structure for implementing the interface for the generalized setting with
the freeze quantifier. Note that this presentation-independent description also allows us to separate concerns in the
monitor’s correctness proof (cf. Section 5.3). The interface comprises the following procedures.
– Clone(gate): returns a copy of gate.
– IsBool(gate): returns true iff gate is semantically equivalent to a Boolean constant.
– ToBool(gate): returns the Boolean value b ∈ 2, provided that gate is semantically equivalent to the corresponding
Boolean constant.
– Contains(gate, p): returns true iff gate depends on the proposition p, that is, [p 7→ t](gate) . [p 7→ f](gate). We shall
abuse terminology in the following by also saying that p occurs in gate, although the occurrence of a proposition in
a formula can be representation dependent.
– Eval(gate, θ ): applies the substitution θ to gate, where θ only replaces propositions p with one of the Boolean
constants t or f.
– Instantiate(gate): substitutes Boolean constants for the propositions of the form tpL , tpL , mcL,L
′
I , and (t)L in gate,
wherever possible. Note that the Boolean constants for these propositions can be determined by their name. For
instance, mcL,L
′
I is replaced by t iff L − L′ , ∅ and L − L′ ⊆ I , and by f iff I ∩ (L − L′) = ∅. Furthermore, note that
Instantiate is a special case of Eval.
– Rename(gate, θ ): applies the substitution θ to gate, where θ only renames propositions p with some proposition p′.
For the following last two interface procedures Add and Remove, we first introduce the following additional notion.
The propositional formulas θw (Ψγ , Jw ) and hence also gateγ , J can be grouped into subformulas with respect to an
interval and a direct subformula of γ . For instance, note that gateαUI β, J is semantically equivalent to
∨
K ≥ J (anchorK ∧∧
H ≤L<K continuationL), with anchorK = tpK ∧mcK, JI ∧ βK ∧ (tp
K → αK ) and continuationL = tpL → αL , possibly
with some of their literals replaced by Boolean constants, and where the intervals K and L range over the intervals of the
letters in observation. The (β ,K)-relevant part of gateαUI β, J is the propositional formula anchorK . The (α ,L)-relevant
part of gateαUI β, J is the propositional formula continuationL if L , J , and, if L = J , the subformula tp
J → α J of
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procedure Init(φ )
observation :=w0
foreach γ with γ ∈ sub(φ) and not IsAtom(γ ) do
# Iterate top down with respect to φ 's formula structure.
gateγ , [0,∞) := Ψγ , [0,∞)w0
Instantiate(gateγ , [0,∞))
if IsBool(gateγ , [0,∞)) then
PropagateTruthValue(γ , [0, ∞), ToBool(gateγ , [0,∞)))
Listing 2. Initialization procedure.
anchor J , possibly with some propositions replaced by Boolean constants. Note that the relevant part can be t or f.
For example, for the formula θw ′(Ψγ ,K1w ′ ) in Example 4.2, the (β ,K1)-relevant part is βK1 , the (β,K2)-relevant part is
tpK2 ∧ βK2 ∧ (tpK2 → αK2 ), and the (β ,H )-relevant part is f, for H being K0, J1, or J2. Furthermore, the (α ,K2)-relevant
part is tpK2 → αK2 and the (α ,H )-relevant part is t, for H being K0, K1, J1, or J2. The definition of the relevant parts
for other formulas γ is as expected and omitted. For instance, the (α , J )-relevant part of gateα∨β, J = α J is α J and its
(β , J )-relevant part is f. Note that for temporal formulas the relevant parts are always defined for their direct subformulas.
For nontemporal formulas, the relevant parts are only defined for their direct subformulas and when the intervals
match.
– Add(gate, α , K , Θ): replaces the (α ,K)-relevant part of gate with the propositional formula Θ. We require that Θ is
of the form of the relevant parts of gate.
– Remove(gate, α , K ): returns the (α ,K)-relevant part of gate and “removes” it from gate. For anchors, the removal
corresponds to a replacement with the Boolean constant f. For continuations, the relevant part is replaced by the
Boolean constant t.
4.2.3 Initialization. The procedure Init, shown in Listing 2, initializes the state variables. Initially, observation
is the word w0. Recall that w0 =
([0,∞), ([ ], [ ])) . Furthermore, for γ ∈ sub(φ), Init initializes gateγ ,[0,∞) with the
propositional formula θw0 (Ψγ ,[0,∞)w0 ). For this, the Init procedure uses the interface procedure Instantiate and the
procedure PropagateTruthValue, which we present in Section 4.3.3, for propagating Boolean values up the formula
structure. Since the formula is traversed top-down, Boolean truth values are always propagated to already initialized
state variables.
4.3 Algorithmic Details
In the following, we provide algorithmic details for the monitor’s central procedures AddTimePoint, RemoveInterval,
and PropagateTruthValue. Recall from Section 4.1 that each of these procedures updates the monitor’s state, in particular,
the propositional formulas stored in the gate variables according to one of the transformations (T1), (T2), and (T3).
4.3.1 Adding a Time Point. The pseudocode of the procedure AddTimePoint is given in Listing 3. Suppose that the
respective transformation splits the interval J at τ . For τ > 0, we obtain the new intervals L := J ∩ [0,τ ), T := {τ }, and
R := J ∩ (τ ,∞). For brevity, we do not present the details for the corner case τ = 0, where we only obtain two new
intervals, {0} and J \ {0}. We first create for each γ ∈ sub(φ) three copies of gateγ , J . Namely, we create the propositional
formulas gateγ ,L , gateγ ,T , and gateγ ,R . Afterwards, we remove all the propositional formulas for the interval J from
the monitor’s state, that is, we delete gateγ , J , for all γ ∈ sub(φ). We then handle the special case where gateφ, {τ } is
semantically equivalent to a Boolean constant, which results in outputting a verdict for the new time point.
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procedure AddTimePoint(φ , J , τ )
foreach gateγ , J and K ∈ {J ∩ [0, τ ), {τ }, J ∩ (τ , ∞)} do
gateγ ,K := Clone(gateγ , J )
Delete(J )
if IsBool(gateφ, {τ } ) then
OutputVerdict({τ }, ToBool(gateφ, {τ } ))
foreach gateγ ,H with Contains(gateγ ,H , p),
for some proposition p with the interval J do
# Iterate top down with respect to φ 's formula structure.
case γ = ¬α : Rename(gateγ ,H , [α J 7→ αH ])
case γ = α ∨ β : Rename(gateγ ,H , [α J 7→ αH , β J 7→ βH ])
case γ =  I α : . . . # Omitted; analogous to the next case.
case γ = #I α : RefineNext(γ , H , J , τ )
Instantiate(gateγ ,H )
case γ = α SI β : . . . # Omitted; analogous to the next case.
case γ = α UI β : RefineUntil(γ , H , J , τ )
Instantiate(gateγ ,H )
if IsBool(gateγ ,H ) then
PropagateTruthValue(γ , H , ToBool(gateγ ,H ))
Listing 3. Procedure for transformation (T1).
procedure RemoveInterval(K )
foreach gateγ , J with J , K and Contains(gateγ , J , tpK ) do
Eval(gateγ , J , [tpK 7→ f])
if IsBool(gateγ , J ) then
PropagateTruthValue(γ , J , ToBool(gateγ , J ))
Delete(K )
Listing 4. Procedure for transformation (T2).
procedure PropagateTruthValue(α , J , b )
if IsRoot(α ) and | J | = 1 then
OutputVerdict(J , b )
else if not IsRoot(α ) then
foreach gateγ ,K with Contains(gateγ ,K , α J ) do
Eval(gateγ ,K , [α J 7→ b])
if IsBool(gateγ , J ) then
PropagateTruthValue(γ , J , ToBool(gateγ , J ))
Listing 5. Procedure for transformation (T3).
procedure RefineNext(#I α , H , J , τ )
γ , L, T , R :=#I α , J ∩ [0, τ ), {τ }, J ∩ (τ , ∞)
C0 ,C1 := Remove(gateγ ,H , α , H ), Remove(gateγ ,H , α , H + 1)
Remove(gateγ ,H , α , H + 2)
if H ⊈ J then # Note that J = H + 1, |H | = 1, andC0 ≡ f.
Add(gateγ ,H , α , L, [mc J ,HI 7→ mc
L,H
I , tp
J 7→ tpL, α J 7→ αL ](C1))
Add(gateγ ,H , α , T , [mc J ,HI 7→ mc
T ,H
I , tp
J 7→ ¬tpL, α J 7→ αT ](C1))
else if H = L then
Add(gateγ ,H , α , L, [mc J , JI 7→ mc
L,L
I , tp
J 7→ tpL, α J 7→ αL ](C0))
Add(gateγ ,H , α , T , [mc J , JI 7→ mc
T ,L
I , tp
J 7→ ¬tpL, α J 7→ αT ](C0))
else if H = T then
Add(gateγ ,H , α , R , [mc J , JI 7→ mc
R,T
I , tp
J 7→ ¬tpR , α J 7→ αR ](C0))
Add(gateγ ,H , α , H + 2, [mcH+2, JI 7→ mc
H+2,T
I , tp
J 7→ ¬tpR ](C1))
else if H = R then
Add(gateγ ,H , α , R , [mc J , JI 7→ mc
R,R
I , tp
J 7→ tpR , α J 7→ αR ](C0))
Add(gateγ ,H , α , H + 2, [mc J+1, JI 7→ mc
H+2,R
I , tp
J 7→ tpR ](C1))
Listing 6. Auxiliary procedure for (T1) and the connective #I .
procedure RefineUntil(α UI β , H , J , τ )
γ , L, T , R := α UI β , J ∩ [0, τ ), {τ }, J ∩ (τ , ∞)
anchor, continuation := Remove(gateγ ,H , β , J ), Remove(gateγ ,H , α , J )
foreach K with K ∈ {L, T , R } and H ≤ K do
θ := [α J 7→ αK , β J 7→ βK , tpJ 7→ tpK ] ∪
[mc J ,LI 7→ mc
K,L
I | for some interval L]
Add(gateγ ,H , β , K , θ [tpJ 7→ tpK ](anchor))
Add(gateγ ,H , α , K , θ [tpJ 7→ tpK ](continuation))
if H ⊆ J then
Rename(gateγ ,H , [mcL, JI 7→ mc
L,H
I | for some interval L])
Listing 7. Auxiliary procedure for (T1) and the connective UI .
Finally, we update the propositional formulas gateγ ,H in which a proposition with the interval J occurs. Note that
H can be different from L, T , and R when γ is a temporal formula. We make a case split on γ ’s form. The cases p, ¬α ,
and α ∨ β are obvious. We replace any proposition with the interval J by the corresponding proposition with the
intervalH . Let us turn to the case where γ is of the form α UI β . We omit the dual case α SI β . The procedure RefineUntil,
shown in Listing 7, updates the anchor and continuation subformulas of the propositional formula gateγ ,H , that is, the
(β, J )-relevant and (α , J )-relevant parts of gateγ ,H .
– If H > J , then we replace the (β, J )-relevant part with the three relevant parts for the intervals L, T , and R. They
originate from the (β , J )-relevant part. Similarly, we replace the (α , J )-relevant parts.
– If H is one of the intervals L, T , or R, then we replace the relevant parts with the interval J up to the interval H .
Furthermore, we need to adjust the J interval in the mc propositions in gateγ ,H .
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After RefineUntil, AddTimePoint calls Instantiate to replace propositions with Boolean constants where possible. Note
that after the instantiation, gateγ ,H can be semantically equivalent to a Boolean constant. The if statement at the end
of the second foreach loop performs the corresponding check and triggers the propagation.
Finally, let us consider the case where γ is of the form #I α . We omit the dual case  I α . The procedure RefineNext,
shown in Listing 6, updates a propositional formula gateγ ,H as follows. It first removes all its relevant parts. Note
that these have one of the three intervals H , H + 1, and H + 2. Then, depending on whether H ⊈ J or H is one of the
intervals L, T , or R, RefineNext adds the new relevant parts to gateγ ,H . These parts originate from the old relevant
parts with the intervals H and H + 1.
4.3.2 Removing an Interval. The pseudocode of the procedure RemoveInterval is given in Listing 4. Since K does not
contain any time points, we replace any occurrence of the proposition tpK by f. It suffices to only update propositional
formulas gateγ , J , where γ is a temporal formula and J , K . Note that this replacement could trigger the propagation of
Boolean values. For instance, we propagate f from gateαUI β, J , if K is the only anchor in gateαUI β, J , that is, if for all
H , K , the (β,H )-relevant part of gateαUI β, J is f. Afterwards, we delete all the propositional formulas gateγ ,K with
γ ∈ sub(φ) from the monitor’s state.
4.3.3 Propagating a Boolean Value. The pseudocode of the procedure PropagateTruthValue is given in Listing 5. The
procedure is called whenever a propositional formula gateα, J simplifies to a Boolean constant b. If |J | = 1 and α = φ,
then we output a verdict. Otherwise, for α , φ, we substitute the proposition α J with its Boolean value b in all the
propositional formulas gateγ ,K . Note that γ must be the parent formula of α . However, for temporal formulas, K can be
different from J . We continue the propagation whenever the updated gateγ ,K propositional formula is semantically
equivalent to a Boolean constant.
5 MONITORINGWITH DATA VALUES
In this section, we extend the online algorithm from Section 4 for MTL to MTL↓. The handling of the freeze quantifier
is orthogonal to the core ideas already used for monitoring MTL specifications. In Section 5.1, we present the extension.
In Section 5.2, we describe the graph-based data structure for representing and manipulating the propositional formulas
of the monitor’s state. Finally, in Section 5.3, we establish the algorithm’s correctness. Note that the data structure and
the correctness proof also apply to the restricted setting of Section 4, that is, the online algorithm for MTL.
5.1 Algorithmic Details
Throughout this section, we reuse the conventions that we introduced in Section 4 for MTL. Analogous to Section 4, we
also assume that φ is not an atomic formula and subformulas of φ are pairwise distinct. Furthermore, we require that
the monitored formula φ is closed. Finally, we assume that variables are frozen at most once in φ. This assumption is
also without loss of generality and it allows us to identify a frozen variable with the respective subformula.
5.1.1 Reduction to Propositional Logic. Similar to MTL, at the core of the monitor for MTL↓ is a mapping of MTL↓’s
three-valued semantics into propositional logic. To this end, we first extend the propositional formulas Ψγ , Jw from
Section 4.2 to Ψγ , J ,νw to capture MTL↓’s freeze quantifier. We remark that the only change in the definition below is
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that each proposition for a subformula α ∈ sub(φ) now also carries a partial valuation ν in addition to an interval K .
Ψ
γ , J ,ν
w :=

t if γ = t
p(x)J ,ν if γ = p(x) with p ∈ P
α J ,ν [x 7→⊥] if γ = ↓rx . α and r < def(ϱj )
α J ,ν [x 7→ϱj (r )] if γ = ↓rx . α and r ∈ def(ϱj )
¬α J ,ν if γ = ¬α
α J ,ν ∨ β J ,ν if γ = α ∨ β∨
K ≤ J
(
tpK ∧mc J ,KI ∧ βK,ν ∧ (tp
K → αK,ν ) ∧∧K<H ≤ J (tpH → αH,ν )) if γ = α SI β∨
K ≥ J
(
tpK ∧mcK, JI ∧ βK,ν ∧ (tp
K → αK,ν ) ∧∧J ≤H<K (tpH → αH,ν )) if γ = α UI β
C J ,0,νw ∨C J ,−1,νw ∨C J ,−2,νw if γ =  I α
C J ,0,νw ∨C J ,+1,νw ∨C J ,+2,νw if γ = #I α
with
C J ,±ℓ,νw :=

mc J , JI ∧ α J ,ν ∧ ¬tpJ if ℓ = 0 and I , {0}
mcmax{J , J±1},min{J , J±1}I ∧ α J±1,ν ∧ tpJ ∧ tpJ±1 if ℓ = ±1 and j ± 1 ∈ pos(w)
mcmax{J , J±2},min{J , J±2}I ∧ α J±2,ν ∧ ¬tpJ±1 if ℓ = ±2 and j ± 2 ∈ pos(w)
f otherwise
In the following, let θw be the substitution that maps a proposition of the form αK,ν to Jw,k,ν |≈ αK, provided thatJw,k,ν |≈ αK ∈ 2, and for the other propositions, θw is as in Section 4, namely,
tpK 7→ t if |K | = 1, mcH,KI 7→

t if H − K , ∅ and H − K ⊆ I ,
f if (H − K) ∩ I = ∅, and
tpK 7→ f if |K | = 1.
Example 5.1. We illustrate the definition of the propositional formulas Ψγ , J ,νw . Consider the formula ↓rx . α with
α = 2(0,1] p(x). For readability, we use β for the subformula p(x). Letw be the observation ([0,τ ), ([ ], [ ])) ({τ }, ([ ], [r 7→
d])) ((τ ,∞), ([ ], [ ])) . We obtain the following propositional formulas, where J0 = [0,τ ), J1 = {τ }, J2 = (τ ,∞), and
β¯ J ,H,ν abbreviates the conjunction tpH ∧mc J ,HI ∧ βH,ν .
θw (Ψ↓
r x.α, J0,[ ]
w ) ≡ α J0,[ ] θw (Ψ↓
r x.α, J1,[ ]
w ) ≡ α J1,[x 7→d ] θw (Ψ↓
r x.α, J2,[ ]
w ) ≡ α J2,[ ]
θw (Ψα, J0,[ ]w ) ≡ β¯ J0, J0,[ ] ∨ β¯ J1, J0,[ ] ∨ β¯ J2, J0,[ ] θw (Ψα, J1,[x 7→d ]w ) ≡ β¯ J2, J1,[x 7→d ] θw (Ψα, J2,[ ]w ) ≡ β¯ J2, J2,[ ]
First, note that as 2(0,1] β is syntactic sugar for tU(0,1]β , we can ignore the continuation subformulas in the propositional
formulas, since they simplify to t. Furthermore, note that θw (Ψα, J1,[x 7→d ]w ) has only one anchor subformula (different
from a propositional constant), since α ’s temporal constraint (0, 1] is unsatisfiable for J1, that is, θw (mc J1, J1(0,1] ) = f and
hence θw (β¯ J1, J1,[x 7→d ]) ≡ f. Finally, note that for β and J2, we have the two propositions β J2,[ ] and β J2,[x 7→d ], where
β J2,[ ] occurs in both θw (Ψα, J0,[ ]w ) and θw (Ψα, J2,[ ]w ), and β J2,[x 7→d ] occurs once in θw (Ψα, J1,[x 7→d ]w ). 
Lemma 4.1 for MTL carries over to MTL↓ and its propositional formulas Ψγ , J ,νw .
Lemma 5.2. The following two statements hold.
(1) If Jw, j,ν |≈ γ K ∈ 2, then θw (Ψγ , J ,νw ) ≡ Jw, j,ν |≈ γ K.
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procedureMonitorMTL↓(φ )
Init(φ )
loop
m := ReceiveMessage()
ts := UpdateKnowledge(m)
foreach t in ts do
case (T1): τ , J := DeltaT1(t )
AddTimePoint(φ , J , τ )
case (T2): K := DeltaT2(t )
RemoveInterval(K )
case (T3.1): τ , σ := DeltaT31(t )
foreach p(x ){τ },ν with p ∈ def(σ ) and x ∈ def(ν ) do
PropagateTruthValue(p(x ), {τ }, ν , ν (x ) ∈ σ (p))
case (T3.2): τ , ϱ := DeltaT32(t )
foreach α {τ },ν with ↓r x . α ∈ sub(φ) and r ∈ def(ϱ) do
Rename(gate↓r x.α , {τ },ν , [α {τ },ν 7→ α {τ },ν [x 7→ϱ (r )]])
PropagateDataValue(α , {τ }, ν , [x 7→ ϱ(r )])
Listing 8. The monitor’s main loop for MTL↓.
procedure Init(φ )
observation :=w0
foreach γ ∈ sub(φ) with not IsAtom(γ ) do
# Iterate top down with respect to φ 's formula structure.
gateγ , [0,∞), [ ] := Ψγ , [0,∞), [ ]w0
Instantiate(gateγ , [0,∞), [ ])
if IsBool(gateγ , [0,∞), [ ]) then
PropagateTruthValue(γ , [0, ∞), [ ], ToBool(gateγ , [0,∞), [ ]))
Listing 9. Initialization procedure.
(2) If Jw, j,ν |≈ γ K = ⊥, then θw (Ψγ , J ,νw ) . t and θw (Ψγ , J ,νw ) . f.
Proof. We prove the lemma by a case split on γ . The case γ = t is obvious and omitted. For the case γ = p(x),
we have by definition that Ψp(x ), J ,νw = p(x)J ,ν . Furthermore, when Jw, j,ν |≈ p(x)K ∈ 2, we have that θw (p(x)J ,ν ) =Jw, j,ν |≈ p(x)K; otherwise, θw is not defined for p(x)J ,ν . We conclude that both implications (1) and (2) hold. The
cases for ¬α and α ∨ β are similar and omitted. We also omit the details of the case for γ = ↓rx . α as it is also similar
to the case p(x). Note that for r < def(ϱj ), we have that Ψ↓
r x.α, J ,ν
w = α
J ,ν [x 7→⊥] and Ψ↓
r x.α, J ,ν
w = α
J ,ν [x 7→ϱj (r )], for
r ∈ def(ϱj ).
Finally, we provide proof details for the case γ = α SI β . The cases for the other three temporal connectives are
similar and omitted. For K with K ≤ J , the disjunction of the propositional formulas Ψ := tpK ∧mc J ,KI ∧ βK,ν ∧(tp
K →
αK,ν )∧∧K<H ≤ J (tpH → αH,ν ) of ΨαSI β, J ,νw follows closely the semantic definition of Jw, j,ν |≈ α SI βK in Section 3.2,
except that eachΨ contains the additional propositional subformula tpK → αK,ν . First, observe that the propositions tpK
and mc J ,KI together with the substitution θw take the role of tpw (k) and mcw, I (j,k). Furthermore, θw replaces the
propositions βK,ν and αH,ν in Ψ with the corresponding Boolean constants whenever the respective formulas evaluate
to Boolean truth values under the three-valued semantics J·K. Finally, we observe that the additional propositional
subformula tpK → αK,ν in Ψ simplifies to t when |K | = 1, since θw (tpK ) = f. For |K | > 1, tpK → αK,ν simplifies
either to tpK → αK,ν , tpK , or t. Since θw is also not defined for tpK , when |K | > 1, θw (Ψ) . t. Furthermore, θw (Ψ) . f
if θw (βK,ν ) . f and θw (αH,ν ) . f, for all H with |H | = 1 and K < H ≤ J . With these observations, it is easy to see that
the implications (1) and (2) hold. □
5.1.2 Main Procedure. The monitor’s main procedure for MTL↓ is shown in Listing 8 and the initialization procedure
in Listing 9. Both procedures are similar to their counterparts for MTL (see the Listings 1 and 2). The main difference
is that the case (T3) now comprises two subcases. The first subcase (T3.1) handles new interpretations for predicate
symbols at a time point and is similar to the (T3) case for MTL in Listing 1. The second subcase (T3.2) handles the
freezing of variables at a time point to data values. Note that in the foreach loops in both subcases, the propositions
p(x){τ },ν and α {τ },ν range over propositions that occur in some propositional formula of the monitor’s state. In the
following, we use (T3.1) and (T3.2) to refer to the transformation of the corresponding subcase, respectively.
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procedure AddTimePoint(φ , J , τ )
foreach gateγ , J ,ν and K ∈ {J ∩ [0, τ ), {τ }, J ∩ (τ , ∞)} do
gateγ ,K,ν := Clone(gateγ , J ,ν )
Delete(J )
if IsBool(gateφ, {τ }, [ ]) then
OutputVerdict({τ }, ToBool(gateφ, {τ }, [ ]))
foreach gateγ ,H ,ν with Contains(gateγ ,H ,ν , p),
for some proposition p with the interval J do
# Iterate top down with respect to φ 's formula structure.
case γ = ¬α : Rename(gateγ ,H ,ν , [α J ,ν 7→ αH ,ν ])
case γ = α ∨ β : Rename(gateγ ,H ,ν , [α J ,ν 7→ αH ,ν , β J ,ν 7→ βH ,ν ])
case γ = ↓sy . α : Rename(gateγ ,H ,ν ,
[α J ,µ 7→ αH ,µ | µ some partial valuation])
case γ =  I α : . . . # Omitted; analogous to the next case.
case γ = #I α : RefineNext(γ , H , ν , J , τ )
Instantiate(gateγ ,H ,ν )
case γ = α SI β : . . . # Omitted; analogous to the next case.
case γ = α UI β : RefineUntil(γ , H , ν , J , τ )
Instantiate(gateγ ,H ,ν )
if IsBool(gateγ ,H ,ν ) then
PropagateTruthValue(γ , H , ν , ToBool(gateγ ,H ,ν ))
Listing 10. Procedure for transformation (T1).
procedure RemoveInterval(K )
foreach gateγ , J ,ν with J , K and Contains(gateγ , J ,ν , tpK ) do
Eval(gateγ , J ,ν , [tpK 7→ f])
if IsBool(gateγ , J ,ν ) then
PropagateTruthValue(γ , J , ν , ToBool(gateγ , J ,ν ))
Delete(K )
Listing 11. Procedure for transformation (T2).
procedure PropagateTruthValue(α , J , ν , b )
if IsRoot(α ) and | J | = 1 then
OutputVerdict(J , b )
else if not IsRoot(α ) then
foreach gateγ ,K,µ with Contains(gateγ ,K,µ , α J ,ν ) do
Eval(gateγ ,K,µ , [α J ,ν 7→ b])
if IsBool(gateγ ,K,µ ) then
PropagateTruthValue(γ , K , µ , ToBool(gateγ ,K,µ ))
Listing 12. Procedure for transformation (T3.1).
procedure PropagateDataValue(γ , K , ν , [x 7→ d ])
if γ = p(x ) then
σ := PredicateInterpretations(observation, K )
if p ∈ def(σ ) and x ∈ def(ν [x 7→ d ]) then
PropagateTruthValue(γ , K , ν [x 7→ d ], ν [x 7→ d ](x ) ∈ σ (p))
else if gateγ ,K,ν [x 7→d ] does not exist then
gateγ ,K,ν [x 7→d ] := Clone(gateγ ,K,ν )
if IsBool(gateγ ,K,ν [x 7→d ]) then
PropagateTruthValue(γ , K , ν [x 7→ d ], ToBool(gateγ ,K,ν [x 7→d ]))
Rename(gateγ ,K,ν [x 7→d ] , [αL,µ 7→ αL,µ [x 7→d ] | α ∈ sub(γ ),
L some interval, and µ some partial valuation])
foreach αL,µ [x 7→d ] with Contains(gateγ ,K,ν [x 7→d ] , αL,µ [x 7→d ]) do
PropagateDataValue(α , L, µ , [x 7→ d ])
else if IsBool(gateγ ,K,ν [x 7→d ]) then
PropagateTruthValue(γ , K , ν [x 7→ d ], ToBool(gateγ ,K,ν [x 7→d ]))
Listing 13. Procedure for the transformation (T3.2).
5.1.3 State Updates. The central procedures for updating the monitor’s state are the procedures AddTimePoint,
RemoveInterval, PropagateTruthValue, and PropagateDataValue. Their pseudocode is given in the Listings 10–13. The
first three procedures extend their counterparts for MTL from Section 4. The last one is new and propagates data values
down the formula structure. As in Section 4, we do not fix the representation of the propositional formulas of the
monitor’s state. Instead, we use the same abstract interface for accessing and updating the state variables gateγ , J ,ν as
described in Section 4.2.2.
If γ is an atomic formula of the form p(x), then PropagateDataValue first obtains the interpretation of the predicate
symbols at the position k of observation. It starts the propagation of the truth value, if p(x) can be evaluated for the
extended partial valuation ν [x 7→ d]. If γ is not an atomic formula and the propositional formula gateγ ,K,ν [x 7→d ]
for the extended partial valuation ν [x 7→ d] does not exist yet, PropagateDataValue creates it from gateγ ,K,ν . When
gateγ ,K,ν [x 7→d ] is semantically equivalent to a Boolean constant, PropagateDataValue starts the propagation of the
truth value. Otherwise, PropagateDataValue continues the propagation of the new data value down the formula
structure. Finally, if gateγ ,K,ν [x 7→d ] already exists and is semantically equivalent to a Boolean constant, then—as in the
case where gateγ ,K,ν [x 7→d ] is newly created—PropagateDataValue starts the propagation of the truth value.
5.2 Data Structure
We briefly describe a graph-based data structure for representing and updating the monitor’s state variables gateγ , J ,ν .
The nodes of the data structure are tuples of the form (γ , J ,ν ), with γ a subformula of the monitored formula φ, J
an interval, and ν a partial valuation. When γ is not atomic, the node corresponds to the state variable gateγ , J ,ν . A
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node (γ , J ,ν ) stores a truth value b ∈ 3, where the monitor maintains the invariant b = Jobservation, j,ν |≈ γ K. If γ is of
the form α UI β or α SI β , then the node also stores the interval K of the closest valid anchor (i.e., for α UI β , k ≥ j
with tpobservation(k) = mcobservation, I (k, j) = Jobservation,k,ν |≈ βK = t and Jobservation,h,ν |≈ αK , f, for all h with
j ≤ h < k and tpobservation(h) = t), if it exists. Furthermore, nodes with the same formula γ and partial valuation ν are
stored in a doubly linked list, ordered by their intervals. The edges of the data structure are as follows. There is an
edge from the node (α ,K , µ) to the node (γ , J ,ν ) if a proposition of the (α ,K)-relevant part of gateγ , J ,ν occurs in the
propositional formula gateγ , J ,ν . The edges are bidirectional. To simplify the exposition, we use an upward directed
reading, namely, from nodes with the formula α to nodes with α ’s parent formula γ . For instance, both nodes (α , J ,ν )
and (β , J ,ν ) have an outgoing edge to the node (α ∨ β, J ,ν ), provided that the truth value of both nodes (α , J ,ν )
and (β , J ,ν ) is ⊥.
We sketch how this data structure realizes the interface specified in Section 4.2.2. We first note that the graph-based
data structure does not represent the propositional formulas gateγ , J ,ν explicitly. However, an explicit representation
of them can be obtained from its nodes and edges. From the incoming edges of a node (γ , J ,ν ), we can obtain the
relevant parts of gateγ , J ,ν , in particular, the propositions occurring in them. Their arrangement, including the Boolean
connectives between the propositions and the relevant parts, is given through γ ’s main connective and its direct
subformulas. For example, for γ = α UI β , whether the proposition βK,ν occurs in the (β,K)-relevant part of gateγ , J ,ν
can be determined from the node’s (β ,K ,ν ) truth value and the interval of the valid anchor in the node (γ , J ,ν ). Note that
gateγ , J ,ν does not depend on βK,ν when the node (γ , J ,ν ) has a closest valid anchor with the interval K ′ and K ′ < K .
Furthermore, whether the propositions tpK and tpK occur in the (β,K)-relevant part of gateγ , J ,ν can be determined
from the interval of the node (β ,K ,ν ). Similarly, whether the proposition mcK, JI occurs in the (β ,K)-relevant part of
gateγ , J ,ν can be determined from the intervals of the nodes (β,K ,ν ) and (γ , J ,ν ).
The realization of the interface procedures is not difficult. For instance, the procedures Add and Remove simply
add and remove edges. However, some care must be taken for the procedure Eval. Assume that the arguments of Eval
are gateγ , J ,ν and the substitution [αH,ν 7→ f], where γ = α UI β and H > J with |H | = 1. Obviously, Eval deletes the
edge from the node (α ,H ,ν ) to the node (γ , J ,ν ). This deletion may trigger the deletion of other incoming edges to
the node (γ , J ,ν ). First, Eval deletes the incoming edges from the “anchor” nodes (β,K ,ν ), with K > H . Additionally,
Eval deletes the interval L of the node’s (γ , J ,ν ) valid anchor, provided it exists and L > H . Furthermore, Eval deletes
the incoming edges from the “continuation” nodes (α ,K ,ν ) that have no anchor anymore. These “continuation” nodes
may arise when deleting the node’s valid anchor or an incoming edge from an anchor node. Finally, Eval sets the
node’s (γ , J ,ν ) truth value to f, if there are no remaining incoming edges.
Example 5.3. We illustrate the data structure and its updates. Figure 1 shows the data structures associated with the for-
mula ↓rx. 2(0,1] p(x) and the observations (a)w0= ([0,∞), ([ ], [ ])) , (b)w1 = ([0,τ ), ([ ], [ ])) ({τ }, ([ ], [ ])) ((τ ,∞), ([ ], [ ])) ,
and (c) w =
([0,τ ), ([ ], [ ])) ({τ }, ([ ], [r 7→ d])) ((τ ,∞), ([ ], [ ])) . A box in Figure 1 corresponds to a node of the graph-
based data structure, where the node’s formula is given by the row of the box, the interval by the column of the box,
and the partial valuation is given inside the box. The edges are depicted as solid lines between boxes. The dashed lines
are the links of the ordered doubly linked lists. Note that the three boxes in Figure 1(a) and the two boxes in Figure 1(c)
with the partial valuation [x 7→ d] are all stored in singleton lists.
Note that w1 is obtained from w0 by a (T1) transformation that splits the interval [0,∞) at τ , and w is obtained
fromw1 by a (T3.2) transformation that freezes the data value d to the variable x at τ . Observe that Figure 1(c) does
not contain the node ( 2(0,1] p(x), {τ }, [ ]). This node is irrelevant, since it has no outgoing edges. Irrelevant nodes
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↓x . 2(0,1] p(x)
2(0,1] p(x)
p(x)
(a) initial observationw0
[0,∞)
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
(b) observationw1
[0,τ ) {τ } (τ ,∞)
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
(c) observationw
[0,τ ) {τ } (τ ,∞)
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[x 7→d]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[x 7→d]
[ ]
Fig. 1. Graph-based data structure (Example 5.3).
are removed from the data structure. Furthermore, note that the data structure shown in Figure 1(c) represents the
propositional formulas θw (Ψγ , J ,νw ) from Example 5.1. The nonexistence of the node ( 2(0,1] p(x), {τ }, [ ]) corresponds
to the fact that the proposition 2(0,1] p(x){τ },[ ] does not occur in any of the propositional formulas. 
We remark that the data structure allows us to easily determine the propositional formulas gateγ , J ,ν in which a given
proposition αK,µ occurs. We just need to follow the node’s (α ,K , µ) outgoing edges, provided that the node’s truth
value is ⊥. Analogously, by following a node’s (γ , J ,ν ) incoming edges we can determine the propositions that occur
in gateγ , J ,ν . Hence, the foreach loops in the procedures RemoveInterval and PropagateTruthValue, and the second
one in AddTimePoint can be implemented efficiently. The data structure can also be further optimized. For example,
to reduce the number of edges, a node only stores at most one outgoing edge. The other outgoing edges are implicit
and computed on demand by following the links of the doubly linked lists to the neighboring nodes. In particular, the
procedure AddTimePoint needs to update significantly fewer outgoing edges when splitting an interval. We omit such
implementation details.
5.3 Correctness
This section is dedicated to the monitor’s correctness and we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 5.4. MonitorMTL↓ is observationally complete and sound.
Proof. We first observe that the monitor only outputs verdicts with the procedure AddTimePoint(φ, J , τ ) and the
procedure PropagateTruthValue(α , J , ν , b) when α = φ and J is a singleton. In both cases, IsBool(gateφ, J ,[ ]) returns true.
For the second case, observe that PropagateTruthValue is only called when IsBool(gateφ, J ,[ ]) returns true. Moreover, ν
is [ ] in these calls, since state variables gateα, J ,ν with new partial valuations ν , [ ] are only created by the procedure
PropagateDataValue(γ , K , ν , [x 7→ d]), which is never called with the argument γ = φ. Thus whenever the monitor
outputs a verdict (J ,b), then J = {τ } and gateφ, J ,[ ] ≡ b, for some τ ∈ Q≥0 and b ∈ 2.
Let w¯ be a valid observation sequence that represents the monitor’s input. Without loss of generality, we assume
that a single transformation is applied in each iteration, that is, for each i ∈ N, wi+1 is obtained from wi by exactly
one of the transformations (T1), (T2), (T3.1), or (T3.2). For an observationw of w¯ , we denote by gateγ , J ,νw the value of
the state variable gateγ , J ,ν at the end of the iteration that processes the observationw , that is,w is the value of the
monitor’s state variable observation.
Runtime Verification over Out-of-order Streams 27
The equivalence below follows from Lemma 5.8, which is stated and proved later. For an observationw of w¯ , a time
point inw with timestamp τ , and b ∈ 2, it holds that
θw (Ψφ, {τ },[ ]w ) ≡ b iff gateφ, {τ },[ ]w ≡ b . (1)
Furthermore, we note that in the iterationw , the monitor’s state contains the state variable gateφ, J ,[ ] for any interval J
that occurs in a letter ofw .
Observational soundness follows from the above observation onwhen themonitor output verdicts, the equivalence (1),
and Lemma 5.2. To show observational completeness, suppose that [w,τ , [ ] |≈ φ] = b ∈ 2. We must show that the
verdict ({τ },b) is output in this iterationw or has already been output in a previous iteration of w¯ . From [w,τ , [ ] |≈ φ] ∈ 2,
it follows that there is a time point j ∈ pos(w) with the timestamp τ . Furthermore, Jw, j, [ ] |≈ φK = b. It follows from
Lemma 5.2 that θw (Ψφ, {τ },[ ]w ) ≡ b, and by (1), we obtain that gateφ, {τ },[ ]w ≡ b. We are done when the procedure
PropagateTruthValue outputs the verdict ({τ },b). Otherwise, let w ′ Ď w be the first observation in w¯ for which
IsBool(gateφ, J ,[ ]w ′ ) returns true, for some interval J with τ ∈ J . Furthermore, letw ′′ be the observation of w¯ when J ′ ⊆ J
is split into J ′ ∩ [0,τ ), {τ }, and J ′ ∩ (τ ,∞). Clearly, w ′ Ď w ′′ Ĺ w . In this iteration, gateφ, {τ },[ ]w ′′ is set to gate
φ, J ′,[ ]
w ′
by the call to Clone in the AddTimePoint procedure. Note that gateφ, {τ },[ ]w ′′ ≡ gate
φ, J ,[ ]
w ′ ≡ b. After the creation of
gateφ, {τ },[ ]w ′′ , the monitor outputs the verdict ({τ },b) by calling the procedure OutputVerdict. □
In the remainder of this section, we establish the monitor’s key invariants (Lemma 5.7 and Lemma 5.8). The
equivalence (1), used to prove Theorem 5.4, is a straightforward consequence of Lemma 5.8, and Lemma 5.7 is used to
establish Lemma 5.8. To state the invariants, we introduce further notation. As in the proof of Theorem 5.4, let w¯ be
a valid observation sequence that represents the monitor’s input. Again, we assume without loss of generality that
wi+1 is obtained fromwi by exactly one of the transformations (T1), (T2), (T3.1), or (T3.2), for each i ∈ N. Furthermore,
gateγ , J ,νw denotes the value of the state variable gateγ , J ,ν at the end of the iteration that processes the observationw
of w¯ . To simplify matters, we also assume that state variables are not garbage collected even when they are irrelevant.
This assumption does not affect the monitor’s correctness because for an irrelevant state variable gateψ , J ,νw , the
corresponding propositionψ J ,ν does not occur in any relevant gate state variable. The monitor only does more work
than necessary.
The following definition allows us to state which state variables the monitor maintains. For an observationw , we
define inductively the set valw (ψ , J ) of the relevant valuations for ψ ∈ sub(φ) at interval J , where J ranges over the
intervals that occur in the letters ofw , as
valw (φ, J ) := {[ ]} and valw (ψ , J ) :=
{
ν
 θw (Ψγ ,K,µw ) depends onψ J ,ν , for some K and µ ∈ valw (γ ,K)} ,
forψ , φ, with the parent formula γ . Recall that a propositional formula Ψ depends on the proposition p if [p 7→ t](Ψ) .
[p 7→ f](Ψ).
Example 5.5. We revisit Example 5.1 with the formula ↓rx . α and the observation w = (J0, ([ ], [ ])) (J1, ([ ], [r 7→
d])) (J2, ([ ], [ ])) . Recall that α = 2(0,1] β , with β = p(x), J0 = [0,τ ), J1 = {τ }, and J2 = (τ ,∞). We have the following
relevant valuations.
valw (↓rx . α , J0) = {[ ]} valw (↓rx . α , J1) = {[ ]} valw (↓rx . α , J2) = {[ ]}
valw (α , J0) = {[ ]} valw (α , J1) = {[x 7→ d]} valw (α , J2) = {[ ]}
valw (β , J0) = {[ ]} valw (β, J1) = {[ ]} valw (β , J2) = {[ ], [x 7→ d]}
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For instance, [x 7→ d] ∈ valw (β , J2) because θw (Ψα, J1,[x 7→d ]w ) depends on β J2,[x 7→d ] and [x 7→ d] ∈ valw (α , J1). The
latter membership in turn holds because θw (Ψ↓
r x.α, J1,[ ]
w ) depends on α J1,[x 7→d ] and [ ] ∈ valw (↓rx . α , J1), by the
definition of the base case. We also point out the correspondence between the nodes in the graph-based data structure
and the relevant valuations. Compare, for instance, Figure 1(c) and the relevant valuations from this example. 
Finally, we make the simplifying assumption that only a single variable is frozen to a data value by (T3.2) transforma-
tions. That is, we assume that a register occurs at most once in the formula φ. Note that for a register r that occurs twice
in φ, we can replace one occurrence with a fresh register r ′ and assume that r ′ carries the same data value at a time
point as r . Furthermore, we can split a (T3.2) transformation into multiple ones such that the register assignment of any
of these transformations only maps a single register to a data value. Under this assumption, the following technical
lemma holds, which states that when this transformation is used, only subformulas of the freeze subformula containing
the involved register can have new relevant valuations.
Lemma 5.6. Let w and w ′ be observations such that w ′ is obtained from w by the transformation (T3.2), with τ and
ϱ the corresponding timestamp and register assignment, respectively. For any ψ ∈ sub(φ), interval J in w , and partial
valuation ν , it holds that if ν ∈ valw ′(ψ , J ) \ valw (ψ , J ), then ψ is a proper subformula of some ↓rx . α ∈ sub(φ) with
r ∈ def(ϱ) and ν (x) = ϱ(r ). Additionally, the following conditions hold for any partial valuation µ, if also µ ∈ valw ′(γ ,K)
and θw ′(Ψγ ,K,µw ′ ) depends onψ J ,ν , where γ isψ ’s parent formula and K an interval inw .
(1) If µ < valw (γ ,K) then µ(x) = ϱ(r ) and θw (Ψγ ,K,µ[x 7→⊥]w ) depends onψ J ,ν [x 7→⊥].
(2) If µ ∈ valw (γ ,K) then γ = ↓rx . α , {τ } = J = K , and ν = µ[x 7→ ϱ(r )].
Proof. We prove the lemma’s first part by contraposition. Namely, we show that ifψ is not a proper subformula
of some ↓rx . α ∈ sub(φ) with r ∈ def(ϱ) and ν (x) = ϱ(r ), then valw ′(ψ , J ) ⊆ valw (ψ , J ). If ψ = φ then, by definition,
valw ′(ψ , J ) = valw (ψ , J ) = {[ ]}. Let γ beψ ’s parent formula. By assumption, γ is not a subformula of some ↓rx . α with
r ∈ def(ϱ) and ν (x) = ϱ(r ). We have that if θw ′(Ψγ ,K
′,µ′
w ′ ) depends onψ J
′,ν ′ then θw (Ψγ ,K
′,µ′
w ) also depends onψ J
′,ν ′ ,
for any intervals K ′ and J ′ ofw and partial valuations µ ′ and ν ′. Note that θw Ď θw ′ and Ψγ ,K
′,µ′
w ′ = Ψ
γ ,K ′,µ′
w . It follows
that valw ′(ψ , J ) ⊆ valw (ψ , J ).
We make a case split to prove the lemma’s second part.
Case I: ψ = α . That is, γ = ↓rx .ψ . We first show that µ ∈ valw (γ ,K). If, for the sake of a contradiction, µ < valw (γ ,K),
then it follows from the lemma’s first part for γ , K , and µ that γ is a proper subformula of some ↓r ′x ′.α ′, with r ′ ∈ def(ϱ)
and µ(x ′) = ϱ(r ′). This contradicts the assumption that only one variable is frozen to a data value by the transformation.
Hence, µ ∈ valw (γ ,K), and (1) trivially holds. We prove (2). Note that, since γ = ↓rx . α , we have that Ψγ ,K,µw = ψK,ν
′
and Ψγ ,K,µw ′ = ψ
K,ν ′′ , for some partial valuations ν ′ and ν ′′. From ν ∈ valw ′(ψ , J ), it follows that θw ′(Ψγ ,K,µw ′ ) ≡ ψ J ,ν
and thus J = K . From ν ∈ valw ′(ψ , J ) \ valw (ψ , J ), it follows that {τ } = J = K . From the definition of Ψγ ,µ,Kw ′ , it follows
that ν = µ[x 7→ ϱ(r )].
Case II: ψ is a proper subformula of α . As θw ′(Ψγ ,K,µw ′ ) depends on ψ J ,ν , we obtain that θw (Ψ
γ ,K,µ
w ) depends on
ψ J ,ν . If µ ∈ valw (γ ,K), then ν ∈ valw (ψ , J ), which contradicts the assumption ν ∈ valw ′(ψ , J ) \ valw (ψ , J ). Hence,
µ < valw (γ ,K), and (2) trivially holds. We prove (1). From the lemma’s first part applied to γ , K , and µ, we obtain that
µ(x) = ϱ(r ), and therefore µ(x) = ν (x). Furthermore, asψ J ,ν < def(θw ′), we have thatψ J ,ν [x 7→⊥] < def(θw ), and thus
θw (Ψγ ,K,µ[x 7→⊥]w ) depends onψ J ,ν [x 7→⊥]. □
The next lemma establishes the key invariant about the existence of the monitor’s gate state variables.
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Lemma 5.7. Letw be an observation of w¯ , J an interval ofw ,ψ ∈ sub(φ) a nonatomic formula, and ν ∈ valw (ψ , J ) a
partial valuation. The monitor’s state at the iteration that processesw contains the state variable gateψ , J ,ν .
Proof. We reason by induction on the position of w in the sequence w¯ . Recall that we assume, without loss of
generality, that a single transformation is applied to an observation in w¯ . In the base case, the observationw isw0. The
interval [0,∞) is the only interval of a letter inw0 and valw0 (ψ , [0,∞)) = {[ ]}, for anyψ ∈ sub(φ). Since the monitor
has not received any messages, only the procedure Init has been executed so far. Init creates in its foreach loop for
everyψ ∈ sub(φ) the state variable gateψ ,[0,∞),[ ]. This concludes the base case.
For the step case, we assume that the statement holds forw and prove it forw ′, the observation afterw in w¯ . Let
ψ ∈ sub(φ), J an interval of w ′, and ν ∈ valw ′(ψ , J ). We must prove the existence of the state variable gateψ , J ,νw ′ . We
make a case distinction on the type of the transformation t that transformsw intow ′. The cases (T1), (T2), and (T3.1)
are similar and straightforward. We only sketch the (T1) case. Let J ′ be the interval that is returned by DeltaT1(t ), that
is, the interval that is split. If J ⊈ J ′, then it follows that ν ∈ valw (ψ , J ). By the induction hypothesis, we have that
gateψ , J ,νw exists. Since this state variable is not deleted, we have that gate
ψ , J ,ν
w ′ exists. If J ⊆ J ′, that is, J originates
from the interval J ′, then we have that ν ∈ valw (ψ , J ′) and obtain by the induction hypothesis that gateψ , J
′,ν
w exists.
The procedure AddTimePoint creates in its first foreach loop the state variable gateψ , J ,ν by cloning gateψ , J ′,ν .
It remains to prove the (T3.2) case. Let τ be the timestamp and ϱ the partial register assignment returned by
DeltaT32(t ). If gateψ , J ,νw exists, then the existence of gate
ψ , J ,ν
w ′ directly follows from the observation that no state
variable is deleted in the (T3.2) case. For the remainder of the proof, suppose that gateψ , J ,νw does not exist, whereψ
is a proper subformula of φ with the parent formula γ . Note that ifψ = φ then ν = [ ], since φ is closed. It is easy see
that gateφ, J ,[ ]w exists and hence also gate
φ, J ,[ ]
w ′ . From the induction hypothesis, it follows that ν < valw (ψ , J ). From
ν ∈ valw ′(ψ , J ), it follows that θw ′(Ψγ ,K,µw ′ ) depends on ψ J ,ν , for some interval K in w ′ and µ ∈ valw ′(γ ,K). From
Lemma 5.6, we obtain that γ is a subformula of some ↓rx.α ∈ sub(φ), r ∈ def(ϱ), and ν (x) = ϱ(r ). We prove the existence
of gateψ , J ,νw ′ by induction on the distance between α andψ , that is, the formula length ofψ minus the formula length
of α .
For the base case, we have that ψ = α and γ = ↓rx . α . For the sake of contradiction, suppose that µ < valw (γ ,K).
From Lemma 5.6(1), it follows that µ(x) = ϱ(r ). However, from the definitions of valw ′(γ ,K) and Ψγ ,K,µw ′ , we have
that x < def(µ), which contradicts µ(x) = ϱ(r ). Hence µ ∈ valw (γ ,K). From the outer induction hypothesis, it
follows that gateγ ,K,µw exists. By Lemma 5.6(2), we have that ν = µ[x 7→ ϱ(r )] and J = K = {τ }. Therefore,
PropagateDataValue(ψ , J , µ, [x 7→ ϱ(r )]) is called fromMonitorMTL↓. The first else if branch of PropagateDataValue
is executed, which creates the state variable gateψ , J ,ν .
For the step case, we have thatψ is a proper subformula of α . By the inner induction hypothesis, gateγ ,K,µw ′ exists.
Case I: gateγ ,K,µw does not exist. Therefore, gateγ ,K,µ is created atw ′ within PropagateDataValue(γ , K , µ ′, [x 7→ ϱ(r )]),
for some partial valuation µ ′. Note that µ = µ ′[x 7→ ϱ(r )] and x < def(µ ′). It also follows from the outer induction
hypothesis that µ < valw (γ ,K). From Lemma 5.6(1), it follows that θw (Ψγ ,K,µ
′
w ) depends onψ J ,ν
′ , where ν ′ = ν [x 7→ ⊥].
This means that Contains(gateγ ,K,µ
′
w ,ψ J ,ν
′ ) returns true. As gateγ ,K,µw ′ is obtained from gate
γ ,K,µ′
w by cloning and
renaming its propositions, we obtain that also Contains(gateγ ,K,µw ′ ,ψ
J ,ν ) returns true. Therefore, PropagateDataValue
is called with the parametersψ , J , ν ′, and [x 7→ ϱ(r )]. The state variable gateJ ,ψ ,νw ′ is created within this call.
Case II: gateγ ,K,µw exists. It must be the case that θw (Ψγ ,K,µw ) depends onψ J ,ν , since θw ′(Ψγ ,K,µw ′ ) depends onψ J ,ν . It
follows that ν ∈ valw (ψ , J ), which is a contradiction, and hence this second case cannot occur. □
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The final lemma establishes the key invariant about the semantic equivalence of the monitor’s gate state variables
for which we have shown the existence in Lemma 5.7.
Lemma 5.8. Letw be an observation of w¯ , J an interval ofw ,ψ ∈ sub(φ) a nonatomic formula, and ν ∈ valw (ψ , J ) a
partial valuation. It holds that gateψ , J ,νw ≡ θw (Ψψ , J ,νw ).
Proof. As in Lemma 5.7, we reason by induction on the position of w in the sequence w¯ . In the base case, the
observation w is w0. We have that J = [0,∞) and ν = [ ]. Only the procedure Init is executed, which initializes
gateψ ,[0,∞),[ ] with Ψψ ,[0,∞),[ ]w0 . The execution of the procedures Instantiate and PropagateTruthValue, which are called
by Init, results in applying the substitution θw0 to gateψ ,[0,∞),[ ]. This concludes the base case.
For the step case, we assume that the statement holds forw and prove it forw ′, the observation afterw in w¯ . Let
ψ ∈ sub(φ), J an interval ofw ′, and ν ∈ valw ′(ψ , J ). We make a case distinction on the type of the transformation t that
transformsw intow ′. We start with the (T3.2) case.
Transformation (T3.2).We first note that a state variable is modified only by Rename (from PropagateDataValue) and
by Eval (from PropagateTruthValue). Furthermore, a state variable is modified at most once by Rename. Indeed, the first
modification happens just after creating the state variable, using Clone. A second modification cannot happen, because
the else if branch in which the second call would hypothetically occur is executed only when the state variable does
not exist already. Also, a call to Rename cannot be preceded by a call to PropagateTruthValue (for the same gate state
variable). We conclude that the possible modification by Rename precedes the modifications by Eval in the sequence
of modifications of a state variable during the processing of the current transformation. We denote by gateψ , J ,νw→w ′ the
value of the gateψ , J ,ν after the possible modification by Rename, and before the modifications by Eval. Note also that
if gateψ , J ,νw exists, then gate
ψ , J ,ν
w→w ′ = gate
ψ , J ,ν
w .
We have that gateψ , J ,νw→w ′ ≡ θw (Ψ
ψ , J ,ν
w ′ ). Note that the right-hand side of the semantic equivalence uses the substitution
forw and the propositional formula forw ′. The proof is by a straightforward induction on the length of φ minus the
length ofψ . We omit it.
We now prove that gateψ , J ,νw ′ ≡ θw ′(Ψ
ψ , J ,ν
w ′ ). We reason by an inner induction on the size of γ (i.e., on the number
of its connectives). The base case (when the size of γ is 1) is a special case of the step case, and is therefore omitted.
For the step case, consider an arbitrary call to Eval with parameters gateψ , J ,νw ′ and [αK,µ 7→ b]. Clearly, α is a direct
subformula ofψ . If α is atomic, then α = p(x) for some p ∈ P , and PropagateTruthValue(α , K , µ, b) was called from the
PropagateDataValue procedure. Therefore, b = Jw ′,k, µ |≈ αK. If α is not atomic, then PropagateTruthValue(α , K , µ, b)
was called either from PropagateDataValue or from PropagateTruthValue (recursively). From the conditions under
which the call was made (namely, that IsBool(gateα,K,µw ′ ) returns true), we deduce in all cases that b ≡ gate
α,K,µ
w ′ . From
the induction hypothesis and Lemma 5.2, it follows that b = Jw ′,k, µ |≈ αK. Thus, in both cases, b = Jw ′,k, µ |≈ αK.
This also tells us that, for different calls to Eval, a proposition αK,µ cannot be replaced with different Boolean values.
That is, we have shown that gateψ , J ,νw ′ ≡ θ (gate
ψ , J ,ν
w→w ′), for some substitution θ that replaces propositions αK,µ withJw ′,k, µ |≈ αK ∈ 2.
To conclude the (T3.2) case, it suffices to show that for any propositionαK,µ of gateψ , J ,νw→w ′ such that gate
ψ , J ,ν
w→w ′ depends
on αK,µ and αK,µ ∈ def(θw ′)\def(θw ), we have αK,µ ∈ def(θ ). That is, we have that PropagateTruthValue(α , K , µ, b) is
called, where b = Jw ′,k, µ |≈ αK. As αK,µ ∈ def(θw ′) \ def(θw ), we have that either Jw,k, µ |≈ αK < 2 or µ < valw (α ,K).
Note first that as αK,µ ∈ def(θw ′), we have that µ ∈ valw ′(α ,K). We now make a case distinction.
Case I : µ ∈ valw (α ,K). Then Jw,k, µ |≈ αK < 2. Therefore, gateα,K,µw exists (by Lemma 5.7); however, gateα,K,µw is not
semantically equivalent to a Boolean constant. As µ ∈ valw ′(α ,K), gateα,K,µw ′ exists, by Lemma 5.7. Also, from the inner
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induction hypothesis, gateα,K,µw ′ ≡ b. Therefore, Eval was called on gateα,K,µ while executing PropagateTruthValue.
Thus, PropagateTruthValue(α , K , µ, b) is called.
Case II : µ < valw (α ,K). Since µ ∈ valw ′(α ,K), then, as in the proof of Lemma 5.7, we obtain that PropagateDataValue
is called with parameters α , K , µ[x 7→ ⊥], [x 7→ d], where x and d are the variable frozen by the current transformation
and the corresponding value, respectively. Again, since the gateα,K,µw ′ ≡ b by the inner induction hypothesis, we have
that PropagateTruthValue(α , K , µ, b) is called from PropagateDataValue. This concludes the (T3.2) case.
Transformation (T1). Let τ and K be the timestamp and the interval returned by DeltaT1(t ), respectively. Note that
τ ∈ K and we assume that τ > 0. For an interval H of w ′, we define Hˆ := H if H ⊈ K and Hˆ := K if H ⊆ K . As
ν ∈ valw ′(ψ , J ), we have that ν ∈ valw (ψ , Jˆ ). From Lemma 5.7, we obtain the existence of gateψ , Jˆ ,νw .
We first remark that the procedure AddTimePoint creates gateψ , J ,ν in its first foreach loop from gateψ , Jˆ ,ν by
Clone, if Jˆ = K . In AddTimePoint’s second foreach loop, the procedures Rename, RefineNext, RefineUntil, Instantiate,
or Eval may modify gateψ , J ,ν . Note that Rename, RefineNext, RefineUntil, or Instantiate are directly called from
AddTimePoint and at most once. In contrast, Eval is called from PropagateTruthValue, and Eval may modify gateψ , J ,ν
multiple times. Furthermore, Eval’s modifications happen after modifications by Instantiate, which in turn happen
after modifications by Rename, RefineNext, or RefineUntil. The reason is that the loop iterates top-down over φ’s
formula structure. This means, if Eval modifies gateψ , J ,ν in the iteration for some state variable gateγ ,H,µ , then γ is a
subformula ofψ . In particular, modifications by Rename, RefineNext, or RefineUntil on gateψ , J ,ν have been carried out
in an earlier iteration, namely, the one for gateψ , J ,ν . We denote by gateψ , J ,νw→w ′ the value of the state variable gate
ψ , J ,ν
after modifications by Rename, RefineNext, or RefineUntil, and before modifications by Instantiate or Eval.
The proof of gateψ , J ,νw ′ ≡ θw ′(Ψ
ψ , J ,ν
w ′ ) comprises two parts. The first part shows that gate
ψ , J ,ν
w→w ′ ≡ δ (Ψ
ψ , J ,ν
w ′ ), where
δ behaves like θw , except that it carries over the truth value assignment for propositions with the interval K to the
propositions originating from splitting K . That is, we define
δ (p) :=

θw (γ Hˆ,µ ) if p = γH,µ and γ Hˆ,µ ∈ def(θw ),
θw (mcHˆ, LˆI ) if p = mcH,LI and mcHˆ, LˆI ∈ def(θw ),
θw (p) if p ∈ def(θw ) and p is of the form tpH or tpH .
Note that if p ∈ def(θw ), then θw (p) ∈ 2. Also note that δ is undefined for propositions of the form tpH and tpH with
H ⊆ K . The second part, which we omit, since it is analogous to the second part of the previous (T3.2) case, uses the
first part to show that gateψ , J ,νw ′ ≡ θw ′(Ψ
ψ , J ,ν
w ′ ).
For the first part, it suffices to show that the relevant parts of gateψ , J ,νw→w ′ are semantically equivalent to their relevant
counterparts in δ (Ψψ , J ,νw ′ ). Indeed, note that θw (Ψ
γ , Jˆ ,ν
w ) is determined by its relevant parts. As gateψ , Jˆ ,νw ≡ θw (Ψψ , Jˆ ,νw )
by the induction hypothesis, gateψ , Jˆ ,νw and therefore also gateψ , J ,ν when newly created are determined by their relevant
parts. Finally, gateψ , J ,νw→w ′ is determined by its relevant parts, as gate
ψ , J ,ν is only altered through the procedures of the
interface presented in Section 4.2.2 (page 18). In the following, let χ be a direct subformula of ψ and H an interval
of w ′. We assume that the (χ , Hˆ )-relevant part in Ψψ , Jˆ ,νw exists. Otherwise, there is nothing to prove. Furthermore,
Θ(Ψ) denotes the (χ ,H )-relevant part of the propositional formula Ψ, and Θˆ(Ψ) denotes its (χ , Hˆ )-relevant part.
There is a substitution ζ such that Θ(Ψψ , J ,νw ′ ) = ζ
(
Θˆ(Ψψ , Jˆ ,νw )
)
. For instance, if ψ = ¬α , then ζ = [α Hˆ,ν 7→ αH,ν ],
and if ψ = α UI β and χ = β , then ζ = ζ2 ◦ ζ1, where ◦ denotes function composition, and ζ1 and ζ2 are the
substitutions [α Hˆ,ν 7→ αH,ν , β Hˆ,ν 7→ βH,ν , tpHˆ 7→ tpH , tpHˆ 7→ tpH ] ∪ [mcHˆ,LI 7→ mcH,LI | L is an interval inw] and
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2 ↓cid c . ↓t id t . ↓suma . trans(c, t, a) ∧ a > 2000 → 2[0,3] report(t ) (P1)
2 ↓cid c . ↓t id t . ↓suma . trans(c, t, a) ∧ a > 2000 → 2(0,5] ↓t id t ′ . ↓suma′ . trans(c, t ′, a′) → a′ ≤ 2000 (P2)
2 ↓cid c . ↓t id t . ↓suma . trans(c, t, a) ∧ a > 2000 → ((↓t id t ′ . ↓suma′ . trans(c, t ′, a′) → t = t ′)W report(t )) (P3)
2 ↓cid c . ↓t id t . ↓suma . trans(c, t, a) ∧ a > 2000 → 2[0,6] ↓t id t ′ . ↓suma′ . trans(c, t ′, a′) → 2[0,3] report(t ′) (P4)
2 transaction ∧ suspicious → 2[0,3] report (P1′)2 transaction ∧ suspicious → 2(0,5] transaction→ ¬suspicious (P2′)
2 transaction ∧ suspicious → ((transaction→ 2[0,3] report)W unflag) (P3′)2 transaction ∧ suspicious → 2[0,6] transaction→ 2[0,3] report (P4′)
Fig. 2. Formulas used in the experimental evaluation.
[mcL,HˆI 7→ mcL,HI | L is an interval inw ′], respectively. We have that
Θ
(
δ (Ψψ , J ,νw ′ )
)
= δ
(
Θ(Ψψ , J ,νw ′ )
)
= δ
(
ζ
(
Θˆ(Ψψ , Jˆ ,νw )
) )
= ζ
(
θw
(
Θˆ(Ψψ , Jˆ ,νw )
) )
= ζ
(
Θˆ
(
θw (Ψψ , Jˆ ,νw )
) )
. (2)
The first and the last equalities hold because a relevant part is determined even after some propositions have been
replaced by Boolean constants. The other two equalities follow from the definitions.
We remark that ζ is the substitution applied by AddTimePoint to the relevant parts of gateψ , J ,ν when this state
variable depends on some proposition p with the interval K . For instance, if ψ = α UI β and χ = β , then ζ1 is the
substitution applied to the anchor variable and ζ2 is the substitution applied to the state variable, when H ⊆ K , in
RefineUntil (cf. Listing 7). Therefore, we obtain the semantic equivalence
Θ(gateψ , J ,νw→w ′) ≡ ζ
(
Θˆ(gateψ , Jˆ ,νw )
)
. (3)
This equivalence holds even when gateψ , Jˆ ,νw does not depend on a proposition p with the interval K . In this case,
gateψ , J ,νw→w ′ = gate
ψ , Jˆ ,ν
w and there is no proposition in gate
ψ , Jˆ ,ν
w for ζ to substitute.
The right-hand sides of the semantic equivalence in (3) and of the right-most equality in (2) are semantically
equivalent by the induction hypothesis. We conclude that the left-hand sides in (3) and of the left-most equality in (2)
are also semantically equivalent.
Transformation (T2). Let K be the interval returned by DeltaT2(t ). The proof is similar to the (T3.2) case. We only
remark that we use Ψγ , J ,νw ′ ≡ [tpK 7→ f](Ψ
γ , J ,ν
w ) in the base case of the corresponding induction.
Transformation (T3.1). The proof is similar to the (T3.2) case and is therefore omitted. □
6 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We have implemented the online algorithms for monitoring from Sections 4 and 5 in a prototype tool, written in the
programming language Go (golang.org). In this section, we experimentally evaluate the performance of our prototype
tool, focusing on the impact of different message orderings.
Setup. For our experimental evaluation, we use a standard desktop computer with a 3.3GHz CPU (Intel Xeon
E3-1230V2), 16 GB of RAM, and the Linux operating system (Ubuntu 16.04). The prototype was compiled with the Go
compiler 1.10 and executed single-threaded. Furthermore, we use the formulas in Figure 2, which vary in their temporal
requirements and the data involved. (P1) to (P4) express compliance policies from the banking domain and are variants
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of policies that have been used in previous case studies [Basin et al. 2015b]. (P1′) to (P4′) are propositional versions of
(P1) to (P4), except (P3′), which has an additional temporal connective and accounts for the additional event unflag.
In the following, we provide some intuition on (P1) to (P4). We start by explaining the predicate symbols that
model the events that the banking system is assumed to log or transmit to the monitor. The predicate trans(c, t ,a)
represents the execution of the transaction t of the customer c transferring the amount a of money. The predicate
report(t) represents the reporting of the transaction t , that is, t is marked as suspicious. Note that a message sent to the
monitor describes an event and the register values. For instance, when executing a transaction, the registers tid and cid
store the identifiers of the transaction and the customer; the amount of the transaction is stored in the register sum. For
a report event, the register tid stores the identifier of the transaction whereas the other registers for the customer and
the amount store the default value 0.
The formula (P1) requires that a transaction t of a customer c must be reported within at most three seconds if the
transferred amount a exceeds the threshold of $2,000. (P2) to (P4) are variants of (P1). (P2) requires that whenever a
customer c makes a transaction that exceeds the threshold, then any of c’s future transactions within the next five
seconds must not exceed the threshold. (P3) requires that whenever a customer c makes a transaction t that exceeds
the threshold, then c is not allowed to make further transactions until the transaction t is reported. Note that the
syntactic sugarW (“weak until”) is used here instead of the primitive temporal connective U. We do not require that
the transaction must eventually be reported. (P4) requires that whenever a customer c makes a transaction that exceeds
the threshold, then any of c’s transactions within the next six seconds must be reported within three seconds.
Finally, we synthetically generate log files. Each log spans over 60 seconds and contains one event per time point, for
instance, corresponding to a single transaction. The number of events in a log is determined by the event rate, which is
the approximate number of events per second. For each time point i , with 0 ≤ i < 60, the number of events with a
timestamp in the time interval [i, i + 1) is randomly chosen within ±10% of the event rate. For instance, a log with event
rate 100 comprises approximately 6,000 events. The events and their parameters are randomly chosen such that the
number of violations is in a provided range. Note that when the monitor processes an event it performs several state
updates, which correspond to the transformations (T1), (T2), and (T3): (1) The monitor adds a new time point with the
event’s timestamp, (2) it may remove one or more nonsingleton intervals for which the monitor will not receive any
events in the future, and (3) it propagates data and truth values. Since the messages can be received in any order by the
monitor, it must determine whether all events within a time period have been received. To this end, we attach to each
event a sequence number. The monitor removes the nonsingleton interval J if the event’s sequence number for the
time point before J is the predecessor of the event’s sequence for the time point after J . In Section 7, we consider the
general setting where the monitor receives events from different sources.
In-order Delivery. In our first setting, messages are received ordered by their timestamps and are never lost. Namely,
all events of the log are processed in the order of their timestamps. Figure 3(a) shows the prototype’s running times for
different event rates. Note that each log spans 60 seconds and a running time below 60 seconds essentially means that
the events in the log could have been processed online. The dashed horizontal lines mark this border. Memory usage
does not exceed 50MB, except for (P4) where it increases to around 300MB.
Out-of-order Delivery. In our second setting, messages can arrive out of order, but they are not lost. We control the
degree of message arrival disruption as follows. For the events in a generated log file, we choose their arrival times,
which determine the order in which the monitor processes them. An event’s arrival time is derived from the event’s
timestamp by offsetting it by a random delay with respect to the normal distribution with a mean of µ time units and
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Fig. 3. Running times. Here each data point shows the average over five logs together with the minimum and maximum, which are
very close to the average, except for (P3′) in (d).
a standard deviation σ . Intuitively, the degree of “out-of-orderness” increases for larger standard deviations. For the
degenerate case σ = 0, the random delay is 0 and the reordered log is identical to the original log. For σ > 0, the random
delay is, for example, between µ − σ and µ + σ with probability 0.68 and with probability 0.95 between µ − 2σ and
µ + 2σ . This means that for different standard deviations σ ,σ ′ > 0, the random delays for σ are more likely spread over
a larger range than for σ ′ when σ > σ ′, which in the end results in reordered logs where the events are less ordered.
Finally, we remark that the choice of µ does not impact the event reordering; with a large enough mean µ, the random
delays are (most likely) positive.
Figure 3(b) shows the prototype’s running times on logs with the fixed event rate 100 for different deviations, where
µ is fixed to 10 and σ ranges over different values between 0 and 10. For instance, for (P1), the logs are processed in
under a second for σ = 0 and around two seconds for σ = 10. Memory usage stays moderate for small deviations (below
100MB for σ < 1), but can increase significantly for larger deviations (almost 1GB for (P3) with σ = 5 and (P4) with
σ = 1). Reasons for this are the larger data structure and also the queued messages, since messages arrive faster than
they can be processed by the monitor.
Interpretation. For (P1) to (P4), the running times are nonlinear in the event rate. This is expected from Theorem 3.7.
The growth is mainly caused by the data values occurring in the events. A log with a higher event rate contains more
different data values and the monitor’s state must account for these. In particular, the graph-based data structure
contains multiple nodes for a subformula γ and an interval J , but different partial valuations ν . As expected, (P1) is the
easiest to monitor. In addition to the outermost temporal connective 2, it only has a single temporal connective with a
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three second bound and a single block of freeze quantifiers. (P4) is hardest to monitor, since it has two blocks of freeze
quantifiers and two bounded temporal connectives, which are nested, resulting in a time window of nine seconds. The
running times increase when messages are received out of order, which is also expected. For (P1) and (P2), however, the
increase is almost insignificant. In contrast, for (P3) and (P4), the running times increase rapidly. This can be traced
back to the formulas’ larger time window and the two blocks of freeze quantifiers.
In the propositional setting, the running times only increase linearly with respect to the event rate and logs are
processed significantly faster. Furthermore, the out-of-order delivery of events has only a minor impact of the running
times. See Figures 3(c) and (d), where the event rate is one order of magnitude higher. Our prototype processes most
events in a fraction of a millisecond, and a noticeable amount of the computation time is actually spent in parsing the
events. However, some care must be taken when comparing the figures of the propositional setting with the setting
with data values. First, the formulas express different policies. For instance, in (P1′) and (P4′) a report might discharge
multiple transactions. Second, the logs for the propositional settings differ from the logs for the formulas (P1) to (P4). In
particular, the events in the log files generated for the propositional settings do not account for different customers.
Overall, one pays a price at runtime for the expressivity gain given by the freeze quantifier. This price can be traced
back to the number of nodes in the graph-based data structure that the monitor maintains. For MTL, the number of
nodes in the data structure for an interval is bounded by the number of subformulas, whereas for MTL↓, the number of
nodes for an interval is dominated by the different data values that occur in the messages.
To put the experimental results in perspective, we also compare our prototype with the MONPOLY tool [Basin
et al. 2012]. MONPOLY’s specification language is, like MTL↓, a point-based real-time logic. It is richer than MTL↓ in
that it admits existential and universal quantification over domain elements. However, MONPOLY specifications are
syntactically restricted in that temporal future connectives must be bounded (except for the outermost connective 2).
Thus, (P3) does not have a counterpart in MONPOLY’s specification language. MONPOLY handles the counterparts of
(P1), (P2), and (P4) significantly faster, up to three orders of magnitude. In the propositional setting, the running times
only differ by a factor less than five. Comparing the performance of both tools should, however, be taken with a grain of
salt. First, while MONPOLY has undergone several rounds of optimizations, our prototype is fairly unoptimized. More
significant, MONPOLY only handles the restrictive setting where messages must be received in order, and MONPOLY
outputs violations for specifications with (bounded) future only after all events in the relevant time window are available,
whereas our prototype outputs verdicts promptly. For instance, for the formula 2[0,3] p, if p does not hold at the time
point i with timestamp τ , then our prototype outputs the corresponding verdict directly after processing the time
point i , whereas MONPOLY reports this violation at the first time point with a timestamp larger than τ + 3.
In summary, our experimental evaluation shows that one pays a high price to handle an expressive specification
language together with message delays. Nevertheless, our prototype’s performance is sufficient to monitor systems that
generate hundreds of events per second; in a propositional setting, the prototype already handles several thousand
events per second. Furthermore, the prototype can be used as a starting point for more efficient implementations.
7 MONITORING APPLICATION
In this section, we describe a deployment of the online algorithms presented for verifying distributed systems at runtime.
We first describe the system design and the underlying system assumptions. We also discuss some practical aspects and
consequences of our deployment.
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7.1 Deployment
We target distributed systems with multiple interacting components. The objective is to determine at runtime whether
the system’s behavior, as observed and reported by the components, satisfies or violates a given specification φ at some
or all time points.
We sketch our system design, which extends the original system with an additional monitoring component for φ,
where φ is a closed MTL↓ formula. The original system components are instrumented such that they report their
performed actions to the monitoring component by sending dedicated messages over a unidirectional channel. Each
such message also names the performing component and the time. Furthermore, the message contains a sequence
number. That is, each component maintains a counter, which counts the actions it has performed so far, and includes
the counter’s value with every message sent to the monitor. With these numbers, the monitor can determine if no
action has been performed in a given interval (see Section 7.2.1 for details). In addition to the messages that describe the
performed actions, a component can send “alive” messages. They inform the monitoring component that the respective
component has not performed any action for a while. In summary, there are two types of messages: action(C,τ , s,d)
and alive(C,τ , s), where C is the component name, τ ∈ Q≥0 the timestamp, s the component’s sequence number, and d
a description of the performed action.
Before providing further details and discussing the consequences of this deployment, we list and comment on the
assumptions on the underlying system model.
A1: The system is static. This means that no system components are created or removed at runtime. Furthermore, the
monitor is aware of the existence of all the system components. Note that this assumption can easily be eliminated by
building into our approach a mechanism to register components before they become active and unsubscribing them
when they become inactive. To register components we can, for example, use a simple protocol where a component
sends a registration request and waits until it receives a message that confirms the registration.
A2: Communication between components is asynchronous and unreliable. However, messages are neither tampered with
nor delivered to wrong components. Asynchronous, unreliable communication means that messages may be received in
an order different from which they were sent, and some messages may be lost and therefore never received. Note that
message loss covers the case where a system component crashes without recovery. A component that stops executing
is indistinguishable to other processes from one that stops sending messages or none of its messages are received. We
explain in Section 7.2.3 that it is also straightforward to handle the case where crashed components can recover. The
assumption ruling out tampering and improper delivery can be discharged in practice by adding information to each
message, such as a recipient identifier and a cryptographic hash value, which are checked when receiving the message.
A3: System components, including the monitor, are trustworthy. This means, in particular, that the components correctly
report their observations and do not send bogus messages.
A4: Reported actions are consistent. This means that messages from components to the monitor do not contradict
each other. For instance, there are never two messages to the monitor such that one is saying that a proposition p is
true at a time τ ∈ Q≥0 and the other one is saying that p is false at τ .
A5: The system components perform infinitely many actions in the limit. This guarantees that the observable system
behavior is in the limit a timed word. Note that MTL↓ specifies properties about infinite system behavior. In particular,
MTL↓’s three-valued semantics over observations approximates infinite behavior as the interval of an observation’s
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last letter is unbounded and can always be refined. We would need to use another specification language if we want to
express properties about finite system behavior. However, note that a monitor is always aware of only a finite part of
the observed system behavior. Furthermore, since channels are unreliable and messages can be lost, a monitor might
even, in the limit, be aware only of a finite part of the infinite system behavior.
7.2 Discussion
7.2.1 State Updates. Each message may result in multiple updates of the monitor’s state. A message action(C,τ , s,d)
results in adding a time point with the timestamp τ , the propagation of data and truth values, and also the removal of
nonsingleton intervals. A message alive(C,τ , s) may result in the removal of nonsingleton intervals, which in turn may
trigger the propagation of truth values.
With the messages’ sequence numbers, the monitor can infer which intervals can be removed. When monitoring a
single system component, this inference is obvious. We sketch the general case when monitoring a system with the
componentsC0, . . . ,Cm . Let J0, . . . , Jn be the nonsingleton intervals of the letters in an observation. The monitor labels
each of these intervals with a set S Jj of the components from which it may receive an action message with a timestamp
in Jj in the future. Additionally, the monitor maintains for each component Ci triples of the form (s, I , s ′), where I is an
interval and s, s ′ ∈ N with s ≤ s ′. The intuition is that all action messages from Ci with a timestamp in I have been
received by the monitor, and s and s ′ are the smallest and largest sequence number of these messages, respectively. The
monitor adds a triple (t , {τ }, t) when receiving from Ci a message with the timestamp τ and the sequence number t .
The monitor also merges triples when possible. For example, the triples (s, I , s ′) and (t , {τ }, t) with t = s − 1 or t = s ′ + 1
are merged into the triple (min{t , s}, I ⋓ {τ },max{t , s ′}), where I ⋓ {τ } is the smallest interval that contains I and {τ }.
Whenever one of the intervals Jj is a subset of the interval of such a triple, the monitor removes Ci from the set S Jj .
When S Jj becomes empty, the monitor removes the letter with the interval Jj from the observation. Note that the
intervals J0, . . . , Jn can be ordered and stored in a balanced search tree. Analogously, the triples can be ordered and
also stored in balanced search trees with pointers to their predecessors and successors.
7.2.2 Accuracy of Timestamps. The monitor’s verdicts are computed with respect to the information in messages
that the monitor receives from the system components. Even though we assume trustworthy system components (A3),
their observations might not match with the actual system behavior. In particular, the timestamp τ in a message may
be inaccurate because τ comes from the clock of a system component that has drifted from the actual time. One may
wonder in what sense are the verdicts meaningful.
Consider first the guarantees we have under the additional system assumption that timestamps are precise and from
the domain Q≥0. Under this assumption,wi Ď w , for all i ∈ N, where thewi ’s are observations describing the reported
system behavior andw is a timed word that represents the real system behavior. It follows from Theorem 3.5 that the
verdicts computed from the reported system behaviorwi are also valid for the system behaviorw .
Assuming precise timestamps is, however, a strong assumption, which does not hold in practice, since real clocks are
imprecise. Moreover, each system component uses its local clock to timestamp its messages, and these clocks might
differ due to clock drifts. In fact, assuming synchronized clocks boils down to having a synchronized system at hand.
Nevertheless, we argue that for many kinds of specifications and systems, relying on timestamps from existing clocks
in monitoring is good enough in practice. First, under stable conditions (like temperature), state-of-the-art hardware
clocks already achieve a high accuracy and their drifts are, even over a longer time period, rather small [Cristian and
Fetzer 1999]. Moreover, there are protocols like the Network Time Protocol (NTP) (see www.ntp.org) for synchronizing
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clocks in distributed systems that work well in practice. For local area networks, NTP can maintain synchronization of
clocks within one millisecond [Mills 1995]. Overall, with state-of-the-art techniques, we can obtain timestamps that are
“accurate enough” for many monitoring applications, for instance, for checking whether deadlines are met when the
deadlines are in the order of seconds or even milliseconds. Furthermore, if the monitored system guarantees an upper
bound on the imprecision of timestamps, we can often account for this imprecision in the specification. For example,
for checking at runtime that requests are acknowledged within 100 milliseconds, when the imprecision between two
clocks is always less than a millisecond, we can use the formula 2 req → ■[0,1) 2[0,101) ack to avoid false alarms.
7.2.3 Component Crashes. When a system component crashes, its state is lost. For recovery, we must bring the
component into a state that is safe for the system. To safely restart a system component that is not the monitor, we must
restore its sequence number. We can use any persistent storage available to store this number. In case the component
crashes while storing this number, we can increment the restored number by one. This might result in knowledge
gaps for the monitor, since some intervals will never be identified as complete. However, the computed verdicts are
still sound. For the recovery of a crashed monitor, we just need to initialize it. A recovered monitor corresponds to a
monitor that has not yet received any message. This is safe in the sense that the recovered monitor will only output
sound verdicts. When the monitor also logs received messages in a persistent storage, it can replay them to close some
of its knowledge gaps. Note that the order in which these messages are replayed is irrelevant, and they can even be
replayed whenever the recovered monitor is idle.
8 RELATEDWORK
In this section, we examine related work. Our focus is on system verification, in particular, runtime verification, a
well-established area for checking at runtime whether a system’s execution fulfills a given specification. We structure
our discussion along the aspects of multiple truth values, data values, and distributed systems.
Multi-valued Semantics. Multi-valued semantics for temporal logics are widely used in runtime verification, see for
example, [Bauer and Falcone 2016; Bauer et al. 2011; Mostafa and Bonakdarbour 2015; Scheffel and Schmitz 2014]. Their
semantics extend the classical LTL semantics by also assigning non-Boolean truth values to finite prefixes of infinite
words [Bauer et al. 2010]. The additional truth values differentiate when neither some nor all extensions of a finite
word satisfy a formula. However, in contrast to the presented three-valued semantics of MTL↓ used in this paper, the
Boolean and temporal connectives are not extended over the additional truth values. Furthermore, the partial order ≺
on the truth values, which orders them in knowledge, is not considered. Note that having the third truth value ⊥ at the
logic’s object level and the partial order ≺ is at the core of our three-valued semantics for MTL↓ and our monitoring
approach; namely, it is used to account for a monitor’s knowledge gaps. Another difference is that a formula’s truth
value is not defined by the possible extensions of a finite word. As pointed out in Remark 3.13, including the possible
extensions can render monitoring infeasible.
The monitoring approaches by Garg et al. [2011] and Basin et al. [2013], both targeting the auditing of policies
on system logs, also account for knowledge gaps, that is, logs that may not contain all the actions performed by a
system. Both approaches handle rich policy specification languages with first-order quantification and a three-valued
semantics. Garg et al.’s approach [2011], which is based on formula rewriting, is, however, not suited for online use,
since it does not process logs incrementally. It also only accounts for knowledge gaps in a limited way, namely, the
interpretation of a predicate symbol cannot be partially unknown, for example, for certain time periods. Furthermore,
their approach is not complete. Basin et al.’s approach [2013], which is based on their prior work [Basin et al. 2015b],
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can be used online. However, the problem of how to output verdicts incrementally as prior knowledge gaps are resolved
is not addressed, and thus it does not deal with out-of-order events. Moreover, the semantics of the specification
language handled does not reflect a monitor’s partial view about the system behavior. Instead, it is given for infinite
data streams that represent system behavior in the limit. The runtime-verification approach by Stoller et al. [2011]
also accounts for gaps in traces. These gaps are, however, caused by sampling the state of the monitored system to
reduce the runtime-verification overhead and trace elements are processed ordered. Furthermore, their approach is not
based on a multi-valued semantics for a temporal logic. Instead, an a priori trained model (namely, a hidden Markov
model) for estimating the likelihood of missing trace elements is used to compute the probability of the specification’s
satisfaction.
Multi-valued semantics for temporal logics have also been considered in other areas of system verification. For
instance, Chechik et al. [2003] describe a model-checking approach for a multi-valued extension for the branching-time
temporal logic CTL. Their CTL extension is similar to our MTL↓ extension in that it allows one to reason about
uncertainty at the logic’s object level. However, the task they consider is different from ours. Namely, in model checking,
the system model is given—usually finite-state—and correctness is checked offline with respect to the model’s described
executions; in contrast, in runtime verification, one checks online the correctness of the observed system behavior. The
three-valued semantics for LTL provided by Godefroid and Piterman [2011] is also related to our three-valued semantics
for MTL↓. It is, however, based on infinite words, not observations (Definition 3.1). Similar to (T3) of Definition 3.1, a
proposition with the truth value ⊥ at a position can be refined by t or f. In contrast, their semantics does not support
refinements that add and delete letters (cf. (T1) and (T2) of Definition 3.1).
Data Values. Havelund et al. [2018] overview and compare different runtime-verification approaches that allow one to
reason online about data values in event streams. Among them are parametric runtime-verification approaches [Barringer
et al. 2012; Ros,u and Chen 2012] and approaches that handle first-order extensions of temporal logics [Basin et al.
2015b; Hallé and Villemaire 2012]. Those approaches share some similarities to our approach, in particular, how the
freeze quantifier is used to reason about data values. As explained in Example 2.1, the freeze quantifier can be seen as a
weak form of the standard first-order quantifiers. Although the first-order extensions are more expressive than MTL↓,
the expressiveness of MTL↓ seems sufficient for many runtime-verification applications because the data values often
appear uniquely in the events. Handling specification languages with first-order quantification like MFOTL [Basin et al.
2015b] in settings with only partial knowledge and out-of-order event streams is nontrivial and various restrictions
seem to be necessary [Basin et al. 2013]. In a nutshell, in parametric runtime verification, one slices a single event stream
according to the events’ data values in multiple streams, which are then monitored separately and checked against
propositional specifications [Ros,u and Chen 2012] or nonpropositional specifications, as for instance, quantified event
automata [Barringer et al. 2012]. The bindings of the data values within the sliced event streams are implicit in most of
those approaches, and the slicing criteria is hard-coded in the monitoring algorithm. In contrast, the freeze quantifier
explicitly binds the data values to logical variables. Furthermore, our monitoring algorithm for MTL↓ processes a single
event stream.
Feng et al. [2017] define a similar extension of MTL with the freeze quantifier as in MTL↓. Their analysis focuses on
the computational complexity of the path-checking problem. However, they use a finite trace semantics, which is less
suitable for runtime verification. Brim et al. [2014], and Ryckbosch and Diwan [2014] also provide extensions of LTL
with the freeze quantifier together with monitoring algorithms. Note that the rule-based runtime-verification approach
EAGLE [Barringer et al. 2004] already allowed one, similar to the freeze quantifier, to freeze data values in events to
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variables. Neither Feng et al. [2017], Brim et al. [2014], Ryckbosch and Diwan [2014], nor Barringer et al. [2004] consider
out-of-order messages and knowledge gaps in event streams. Finally, Demri and Lazić [2009] analyze the complexity of
the satisfiability problem of LTL extended with the freeze quantifier. In particular, they provide translations of restricted
fragments to register automata. Applications to runtime verification are not explored.
Distributed Systems. Several runtime-verification approaches have been developed for distributed systems. Fran-
calanza et al. [2018] provide an overview and we limit ourselves here to those approaches that are closely related to
ours. Overall, all of them make different assumptions on the system model and thus target different kinds of distributed
systems. Furthermore, they handle different specification languages. We are not aware of any approach in the literature
that handles specifications with real-time constraints or accounts for network failures.
Colombo and Falcone [2016] propose a runtime-verification approach, based on formula rewriting, that also allows
the monitor to receive messages out of order. Their approach only handles the propositional temporal logic LTL with
the three-valued semantics proposed by Bauer et al. [2010]. In a nutshell, their approach unfolds temporal connectives
as time progresses and special propositions act as placeholders for subformulas. The subsequent assignment of these
placeholders to Boolean truth values triggers the reevaluation and simplification of the formula. Their approach only
guarantees soundness but not completeness, since the simplification rules used for formula rewriting are incomplete.
Finally, its performance with respect to out-of-order messages is not evaluated.
Sen et al. [2004] use an LTL variant with epistemic operators to express distributed knowledge. The verdicts output by
the monitors are correct with respect to the local knowledge the monitors obtained about the systems’ behavior. Since
their LTL variant only has temporal connectives that refer to the past, only safety properties are expressible. Scheffel and
Schmitz [2014] extend this work to handle also some liveness properties by working with a richer fragment of LTL that
includes temporal connectives that refer to the future. The algorithm by Bauer and Falcone [2016] assumes a lock-step
semantics and thus only applies to synchronous systems. Falcone et al. [2014] weaken this assumption. However, each
component must still output its observations at each time point, which is determined by a global clock. The observations
are then received by the monitors at possibly later time points. The algorithm by Mostafa and Bonakdarbour [2015]
assumes lossless FIFO channels for asynchronous communication. Logical clocks are used to partially order messages.
Miscellaneous. The problem of processing streams in which events may appear out of order has also been considered
in contexts other than runtime verification, namely, in stream processing. For example, Srivastava and Widom [2004]
use buffering and heartbeats so that continuous queries are evaluated correctly under the assumption that the heartbeats
are sufficiently large. Various parameters are considered to generate the heartbeats. However, queries are not processed
promptly, but always with a delay. Li et al. [2008] propose a stream-processing architecture with a global mechanism
that reports progress and allows one to finalize a partial evaluation of a query on a time window. Events are processed
promptly. The messages’ sequence numbers, which we use to determine whether the monitor may be missing a message
from a system component in some time period, can been seen as such a global mechanism.
9 CONCLUSION
We have presented a runtime-verification approach based on three truth values to checking real-time specifications
given as MTL↓ formulas. Our approach targets distributed systems and handles the practically relevant setting where
the messages sent to monitors can be delayed, reordered, or lost, and it provides soundness and completeness guarantees.
Although our experimental evaluation is promising, our approach does not yet scale to monitoring systems that generate
thousands or even millions of events per second. This requires additional research, including algorithmic optimizations.
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We plan to investigate this in future work, as well as to deploy and evaluate our approach in realistic, large-scale case
studies.
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